Gray Sergeant, Department of International History
While the United Kingdom recognised the Communists in Beijing and the United States the Nationalists on Formosa, the two Cold War allies were not as far apart when it came to China as one might think. Britain was not blind to the challenges created by Mao Zedong’s revisionist regime. Moreover, most Americans knew that Chiang Kai-shek’s goal of reclaiming the mainland was a fantasy and that, as the 1960s drew on, they had to deal with reality. My research will explore how London and Washington attempted to reconcile their diverging China policies between 1957 and 1972.
During this period leaders in both countries had to grapple with crisis over the Nationalist offshore islands (1958), on the Sino-Indian border (1962), and the streets of Hong Kong (1967). As well as the emergence of China as a nuclear power, the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, and annual wrangling over the United Nations China Seat. Come early 1972 Nixon made his shock visit to Beijing and Britain established full diplomatic relations with China – the allies had aligned (albeit in a seemingly uncoordinated fashion).
My research will identify areas where the UK and the US, in attempting to meet these challenges, aligned and where they diverged in terms of perceptions, interests and policy prescriptions. Where gaps between the two existed, I will explore if and how policymakers attempted to reconcile them or influence the other. Lastly, I will assess how successful these efforts were and, if they were, identify what this reconciliation came at the expense of. Post-Suez, was it really the case that Britain abandoned an independent China policy in order to sure-up the ‘special relationship’?
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