EC476
Contracts and Organisations
This information is for the 2014/15 session.
Teacher responsible
Prof Ronny Razin 32L 4.01
Availability
This course is available on the MPhil/PhD in Accounting, MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics (2 Year Programme), MSc in Economics, MSc in Economics (2 Year Programme) and MSc in Environmental Economics and Climate Change. This course is available with permission as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit.
Pre-requisites
Students must have completed Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics (EC400).
Course content
The aim of the course is to provide a comprehensive introduction to the economics of moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic settings. The course covers the static theory of moral hazard and incentive contracts (static principal-agent models, moral hazard in teams and multi-task incentive contracts) and the dynamic theory of incentive contracts (efficiency of long-run relationships, short-term versus long-term contracts and renegotiation). The course also covers static mechanism design and self-selection contracts (revelation principle for Baynesian-Nash and dominant strategy equilibria, static screening contracts) with applications to non-linear pricing, optimal auctions and regulation, the theory of mechanism design with multiple agents (multiple agents screening and common agency), career concerns and reputation, political economy of institutions, and dynamic mechanism design.
Teaching
20 hours of lectures and 8 hours of seminars in the MT. 20 hours of lectures and 10 hours of seminars in the LT. 2 hours of seminars in the ST.
Indicative reading
No one book covers the entire syllabus; a list of references will be provided at the start of the course. The following textbooks provide a treatment of part of the material presented in the course: Jean-Jacques Laffont, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, MIT Press; D Fudenberg & J Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press; Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement Regulations, MIT Press; Bernard Salanié, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press.
Assessment
A three-hour written examination in the ST.
Non-EME students will be assessed as follows: A three-hour written examination in the ST (50%) and a 6000-word extended essay due at the beginning of the ST (50%).
Key facts
Department: Economics
Total students 2013/14: 26
Average class size 2013/14: 13
Controlled access 2013/14: Yes
Lecture capture used 2013/14: No
Value: One Unit