Shlomi Segall (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): Bad for Whom? On the Disvalue of Inequality

Abstract: Suppose inequality is bad as such, what kind of bad is it? Is inequality bad in a general (or impersonal) way or in a personal way? Is inequality bad for someone in particular, or just bad in general? Some (e.g. Larry Temkin) believe that in so far as inequality is non-instrumentally bad, its badness must be impersonal, while others (e.g. John Broome) hold that it must be bad for someone (predictably, the worse off). In this paper I want to show that both accounts are inadequate and offer a third, hybrid position. With Temkin and the ‘impersonal’ camp, I want to say that the badness of inequality is impersonal in that it denies the person-affecting view. That is, inequality is bad even when it does not harm anyone. But unlike the impersonal account I want to claim that that impersonal badness can and should be parcelled out, as it were, and identified with specific individuals. In that respect my position is obviously closer to Broome’s Personal account. Like Broome I want to say that the badness of inequality resides with particular individuals. But unlike him I want to say that the overall badness of outcomes is larger than the sum of personal bads. This difference (between Broome’s position and mine), we shall see, has concrete implications for the way in which egalitarians should rank different scenarios, and particularly those entailing uncertainty.

My argument proceeds as follows. In the first section I will examine and dismiss some initial arguments one may find in support of the more dominant of the views, namely the impersonal account. An upshot of that initial discussion is to make explicit a distinction about two dimensions of badness that is implicit in the literature, but often not paid sufficient attention to. In section II I discuss how things can be bad in a way that affects welfare (or not), and how they can be bad in a way that either resides with particular individuals, or with no one in particular. The stage is then set to examine the two most worked-out accounts of the respective views. Section III examines Temkin’s impersonal view, attempting to expose both that it is unconvincing as well as in tension with other tenets of his egalitarianism. In section IV I look at Broome’s personal account, and expose its shortcomings for telic egalitarians. I should stress that I offer there no argument against Broome’s personal view, but rather show why it is unappealing to a certain kind of telic egalitarianism (namely that which is unmoved by the person-affecting view). The final section defends the hybrid view (between the personal and impersonal account), and I will close by looking at some potential objections to that account.