Popper Seminar

Abstract: The isomorphism invariance criterion of logical nature has much to commend it. It can be philosophically motivated by the thought that logic is distinctively general or topic neutral. It is capable of precise set-theoretic formulation. And it delivers a plausible extension of ‘logical constant’ which respects the intuitively clear cases. Despite its attractions, the criterion has recently come under…

Abstract: David Papineau (2009) has posed a dilemma for the Fodorian picture of causal laws in the special sciences, involving multiply-realised causes and effects. If the causes are genuinely physically diverse, then their production of a common effect is coincidental; but if they share relevant physical features, it is reducible. Papineau acknowledges that selection offers an answer to this puzzle:…

Abstract: A number of philosophers have argued that certain epistemic norms can be justified by appeal to the fundamental value of truth or accuracy. In his recent monograph (Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, OUP 2016) Richard Pettigrew makes an impressive case for the comprehensive grounding of epistemology in the epistemic utility of accuracy together with standard principles of decision…

When people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, they think thoughts whose linguistic expression makes salient the use of the first-person plural pronoun, ‘we’. Jane Heal (2013) has argued that considerations about the relevance of acts of shared ('we') intentionality, or ‘co-cognition', suggest that the notion of mentality recommended by (social) anti-individualism ought to be privileged in accounts of psychological knowledge. In this paper, I challenge Heal’s argument by distinguishing two routes to understanding claims about the scope and philosophical significance of acts of co-cognition. Both routes lend credibility to aspects of an anti-individualistic view of the nature of thoughts about others’ minds. However, neither provides decisive support for the conclusion that a 'co-cognitivist' account of psychological concepts provides support for anti-individualism.

Today mental health is a universally valued outcome. It is prioritised by governments, hospitals, schools, employers, charities. And yet mental health appears to be prized more as a label than as a concept, because remarkably for a state so uncontroversially prized, it has no accepted definition. In this talk based on joint work with Sam Wren-Lewis I survey the existing explicit and implicit definitions. They turn out to be either too demanding (for example, the one by the World Health Organization which identifies mental health with a happy and productive community life) or not demanding enough (for example, mental health as the absence of diagnosable psychiatric disorder). I articulate the desiderata for a better definition and a potential candidate that meets them.

Abstract: Recently, a putative truism about explanation has come under increasing criticism. The putative truism is this: only obtaining facts and existing entities can explain. If the truism fails, then arguments for realism based on explanatory indispensability are also challenged. I will focus on what I take to be the strongest challenge to the putative truism; namely, the explanatory use of fictions and argue that it possible to rescue a limited version of the truism.

When dealing with incomplete preference or betterness orderings, expansion consistency condition beta is violated. As a result, incompleteness can give rise to dynamic inconsistency. This paper develops global choice principles that ensure dynamic consistency.

An infinite lottery machine induces a non-standard inductive logic that turns out to be the same logic appropriate to a problem in inductive inference arising in present theories of eternal inflation.

I argue that the aim of belief and the aim of science are both knowledge. The ‘aim of belief’ is to be identified with the product of a properly functioning cognitive system. Science is an institution that is the social, functional analogue of a cognitive system, and its aim is the same as that of belief. In both cases it is knowledge rather than true belief that is the product of proper functioning.

Sometimes one ends up in an unfortunate situation when you cannot come to a stable opinion: whatever belief you adopt makes you want to change your mind. I suggest that in such scenarios you should adopt imprecise probabilities.

Abstract: In the first part of the talk we review and critically evaluate the received view of physical possibility. In the second part we sketch two alternative approaches – a metaphysical and an epistemic – to physical possibility which aim to be compatible with actualism, eternalism, humeanism, as well as with a simplistic inductive picture of confirming physical theories.

Assertions are, speaking roughly, descriptive statements which purport to describe some fact about the world. Philosophers have given a lot of attention to the idea that assertions come with special norms governing their behaviour. Frequently, in fact, philosophers claim that for something to count as an assertion it has to be governed by these norms. So what exactly are the norms of assertion? Here there is disagreement. Some philosophers believe assertions are governed by special factive norms, to the effect that an assertion must be true, or known to be true, or known with certainty to be true - or in any case that an assertion is normatively good just in case it meets some condition that entails its truth. Other philosophers place weaker epistemic constraints on good assertion. For instance the claim that an assertion is justified given the assertor's evidence. We argue that no such norm could apply to a special class of scientific utterances - namely, the conclusions of scientific papers, or more generally the sort of utterances scientists use to communicate the results of their inquiry. Such utterances might look like paradigm instances of descriptive statements purporting to describe some fact, yet the norms of assertion philosophers have surveyed are systematically inapt for science. Hence, either philosophers are generally wrong about these norms, or strictly speaking scientists should not be considered to be making assertions at all when they report their results. After surveying our argument for this negative claim, we end by suggesting a norm of utterance that would be more appropriate to scientific practice.

This is a new theory of intrinsic value – of what is good in itself. Its formal approach appears to systematize many of our firm evaluative judgments, while explaining the nature and limits of value pluralism, and explicating the relation between “the right” and “the good.”

Unfortunately, this event has event has been cancelled. We apologise for any inconvenience this may cause.

Abstract: TBA

Julia Nefsky is an Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto. Her research interests include ethics and social and political philosophy.

The aim of this research is to develop a novel way to use computers to ‘evolve’ scientific theories automatically. By using techniques based on genetic programming and simple building blocks (primitive cognitive mechanisms), theories are automatically built, evolved and tested. I will present a system to represent and discover computational models to capture data in psychology. The system uses a theory representation language to define the space of possible models. This space is then searched using genetic programming, to discover models which best fit the experimental data. Whilst the examples are from psychology, the method could in principle be applied to other sciences where experimental data are available. Implications for philosophy of science will be discussed.