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March 2022

Patricia Rich (Bayreuth): “Knowledge in Real-World Contexts: Not Glamorous, but Indispensable”

15 March 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

During the past few decades, many epistemologists have argued for and contributed to a paradigm shift which repositions knowledge as the central concept in epistemology and the fundamental explanatory and normative force. For example, knowledge has been argued to provide the normative standard for assertion and action, and distinguishing knowers from non-knowers has been construed as a central task within epistemic communities. This theoretical primacy of knowledge in the abstract stands in sharp contrast to several recently developed arguments regarding specific aspects of our epistemic lives. This countervailing trend resists applying traditional epistemic norms – including strong knowledge norms – to real-world situations of interest. Specifically, I discuss recent arguments about the norms governing scientific pronouncements, expert testimony in a political context, and the argumentative approach to reasoning. In each case, knowledge initially appears to be dispensable at best. I will argue that knowledge does have a crucial role to play in each of these new accounts, but that its role has been rendered invisible by the framing and rhetoric surrounding them. Acknowledging the role played by knowledge not only allows us to reconcile the more theoretical part of epistemology with its more practical applications, but can help us to further develop the accounts in question.

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May 2022

Brian Hedden (ANU): “Counterfactual Decision Theory”

31 May 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an act in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an act can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an act can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. In cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your act, even though your act cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons.

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June 2022

Juliana Bidadanure (Stanford): “Demonization”

7 June 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

In the age of individual responsibility, those at the bottom of the income hierarchy are routinely shamed. Out-of-work benefits claimants are subject to particularly severe forms of vilification, their unemployment being portrayed as resulting from personal failings. When these shortcomings are constructed as moral failings, we enter the space of what I call “demonization”. Demonization is the act of treating individuals as morally inferior or dysfunctional. Benefits recipients are demonized when they undergo sustained attacks on their moral character, when they are viewed as deliberately choosing idleness over hard work. The trope of the lazy free rider living at taxpayers’ expense is remarkably uniform across advanced economies and has been an effective strategy to undermine support for welfare. Despite its social significance, demonization has received little attention from political theorists. And yet, because demonization diminishes its target’s moral standing, it pauses a critical threat to our ability to stand as equals, which contemporary theorists allege to be an essential component of a just and democratic society. Starting from the example of benefits recipients, my paper analyses the definitional features of demonization, examines its social function, and characterizes what makes it wrongful.

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November 2022

Lillian Cicerchia (Freie Universität Berlin): ‘Value Pluralism Against Liberalism’

15 November 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This paper challenges the common-sense idea in political philosophy that liberalism is the only normative framework that can make room for value pluralism. It diagnoses this common-sense idea as a product of the Cold War, rather than of liberalism’s inherent virtues. The central claim is that value pluralism is desirable, but that liberalism does not deserve its status as its…

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Samuel Fletcher (University of Minnesota): Science in Crisis? Reproducibility and the Philosophy of Science

29 November 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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  Abstract: For several years now, psychology and other sciences have been facing a crisis of confidence: many results and support for theories cannot be reproduced in new experiments. But why is reproducibility important in science, when it is? I will reveal how key ideas from the philosophy of science can help us answer this question, so that we can recognize,…

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December 2022

José Luis Bermúdez (Texas A&M University): Frames, senses, and thought-equivalence

6 December 2022, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: When are we rationally required to treat distinct thoughts equivalently? If I know, for example, that Hesperus = Phosphorus, then I seem to be rationally required to believe F (Hesperus) if and only if I also believe F(Phosphorus). This paper explores whether a comparable requirement holds for preference and value. Can it be rational to prefer A to B and…

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January 2023

Daisy Dixon (Cardiff University): ‘On immoral artists’

17 January 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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An artist’s immorality often affects how we appreciate and interpret their art. My talk will do two things. First, I’ll show that ‘virtue-based’ approaches (Nannicelli 2020) and ‘empiricist’ approaches (Gaut 2007) to the relevance of the artist’s immorality cannot accommodate less easy cases like Hitler’s landscapes – and that they should. Second, after amending the virtue-based account to accommodate these…

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March 2023

Graham Priest (City University of New York): ‘The Looming Environmental Crisis: a Perspective from Buddhist Philosophy’

28 March 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: It is no secret that the world is facing an environmental crisis.  Why should one care? And what should we do? These are questions that concern any thoughtful person.  The answer to them depends, of course, on one’s philosophical views—most crucially, ethical and political. In this talk I will provide an answer to the questions from the perspective of Buddhist…

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May 2023

Felipe Romero (University of Groningen): ‘The conceptual origins of metascience: fashion or revolution?’

30 May 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract. Ten years into the replication crisis, many scientists are experiencing a deep sense of worry and skepticism. In reaction to this problem, an optimistic wave of researchers has taken the lead, turning their scientific eyes onto science itself to make science better. These metascientists have made progress in studying the causes of the crisis and proposing solutions. They have…

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June 2023

Alan Hájek (Australian National University): ‘Consequentialism, Cluelessness, Clumsiness, and Counterfactuals’

6 June 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: According to objective consequentialism, a morally right action is one that has the best consequences. More generally, given a choice between two actions, one is morally better than the other just in case the consequences of the former action are better than those of the latter. (These are not just the immediate consequences of the actions, but the long-term consequences,…

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October 2023

James Muldoon (University of Essex): Artificial Intelligence in the Colonial Matrix of Power

17 October 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This paper theorises how a system of coloniality underpins the structuring logic of artificial intelligence systems. Drawing on the analytic of the 'colonial matrix of power' developed by Aníbal Quijano and the Latin American modernity/coloniality research program, the paper develops a framework for critiquing the regimes of global labour exploitation and knowledge extraction that are rendered invisible through discourses…

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November 2023

Katharine Jenkins (University of Glasgow): ‘Ontology and Oppression: Race, Gender, and Social Reality’

7 November 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This talk draws on the rich history of accounts of race and gender kinds that position these kinds as the products of histories of oppression. I will consider how we should understand the precise ontological and normative status of race and gender kinds in the spirit of these accounts whilst also taking into consideration the fact that many people value…

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Adam Lovett (LSE): ‘Democratic Failures and the Ethics of Democracy’

28 November 2023, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This talk will be an overview of my forthcoming book. The book is about the ways in which real-world democracies fall short of democratic ideals and why those shortfalls matter. The project is rooted in a vast body of empirical findings that political scientists have accumulated over the last seven decades. These are findings about political ignorance, voter behaviour, the policymaking process,…

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January 2024

Jessica Isserow (University of Leeds): ‘The Possibility of Moral Redemption’

16 January, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Many moral wrongs fade into the past, leaving their agents free to move on from them. But others have a curious sort of staying power; they seem to stubbornly stick with their agents, despite the reparative steps that they’ve taken and the personal progress that they’ve made, affecting how others appraise and treat them in turn. In this paper,…

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February 2024

Katherine Puddifoot (Durham University): “Memory” for Justice

27 February, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Philosophers of memory have recent begun exploring the prospect that it may be legitimate to adopt different stances, to achieve different goals, when developing conceptions of memory (Craver 2020; McCarroll et al 2022). In this paper I argue for the importance of a stance that has yet to be considered: the social justice stance. I argue that theorists ought to…

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March 2024

Elise Woodard (King’s College): ‘Mistreating Consent’

26 March, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Consent plays an important role in our lives. Clearly, using someone’s body or property without their consent is typically wrong. However, there are various ways in which consent can be defective or non-ideal. In this paper, I focus on an under-explored way in which consent can be defective, namely in virtue of being moot. In cases of moot consent,…

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April 2024

CANCELLED – Kate Greasley (University of Oxford): ‘Using Law to Improve Morality’

30 April, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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  This event has been cancelled. Abstract: Leslie Green argues that law can be an efficacious and warranted means of improving social morality and bringing it better into line with critical (i.e. ideal or correct) morality. Social sexual morality is a key site, he says, where the law can work to effect positive change. This paper, a contribution to a festschrift…

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June 2024

Catherine Robb (Tilburg University): ‘The Metaphysics of Collective Talent’

4 June, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Talents often a play an important role in our lives, demarcating what we are good at, the subjects we choose to study at school, our future careers, and the activities that we enjoy. The nature and value of talents has been a topic of study in many fields, most notably, psychology, education, organisation management, and more recently, philosophy. However,…

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October 2024

Juliette Ferry-Danini (Université de Namur): ‘A pink lie in French medicine’

15 October, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: I will describe in this presentation my research on the history of phloroglucinol, a popular pharmaceutical in France and a few other countries. In France, phloroglucinol and its brand name Spasfon are one of the most sold and prescribed medications in the country. These incidentally pink pills are also disproportionally prescribed to women for all sorts of pains, notably…

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November 2024

Lucy McDonald (King’s College London): ‘Power and Romantic Relationships’

19 November, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Romantic relationships with significant power imbalances are often considered defective. Charlotte Brontë seems to share such intuitions; in Jane Eyre, the romantic relationship between the novel’s eponymous heroine and Edward Rochester is initially hampered by its power asymmetries. Jane, a poor orphan with no social standing, falls in love with her employer, Edward, a rich, well-connected, significantly older man…

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