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November 2023

Joe Horton (UCL): Newcomb Problems and Unstable Decisions

22 November 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: There has recently been a surge of interest in a new kind of decision theory, which we can call Hindsight Decision Theory (HDT). Its proponents include Ralph Wedgwood, J. Dmitri Gallow, Abelard Podgorski, and David James Barnett. They argue that HDT avoids problems with both Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT). I here argue that the main…

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Choice Group Seminar by Vanessa Carr (LMU): ‘Believing in Success Against the Odds’

29 November 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: We sometimes intend to do things that we appropriately recognise to be difficult, so that the odds of failure are significant. This raises some questions: when intending to do something that one recognises to be difficult, does one believe that one will succeed “against the odds”? What is it to hold such a belief? Can it be rational to hold…

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December 2023

Choice Group Seminar by Erica Yu (Erasmus Institute) and Adam Wingårdh (LSE Philosophy)

6 December 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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    Erica Yu (Erasmus Institute): 'From Signed Orders to Committee Rankings' Abstract: Given a set of candidates for a committee tasked with representing a population in collective deliberations and decisions, individuals not only have preferences for some candidates over others, but also preferences for a candidate’s inclusion or exclusion in the committee. In addition, the approvals and disapprovals of…

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January 2024

Choice Group Seminar by Brian Mcelwee (University of Southampton): ‘The Variability of Moral Demands’

17 January, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Two common thoughts about morality appear to pull us in opposite directions. On the one hand, we may conceive of morality as a common set of rules that equally bind every person. Unlike matters of personal vocation, individual ideals, idiosyncratic tastes and preferences, all of which seem to give reasons to some agents but not others, we tend to conceive…

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Choice Group Seminar by Benjamin Ferguson (The University of Warwick) and Roberto Veneziani (Queen Mary University of London): ‘What Exploitation Is’

24 January, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: We adopt an experimental approach to gauge the philosophers’ view of what exploitation is. Our experimental design does not test existing theories of exploitation. Rather, it focuses on more fundamental properties that are the building blocks for these theories. We find, first, that exploitation is not a vacuous concept: not all economic interactions are deemed exploitative. Second, contrary to several…

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Choice Group Seminar by Alex Gregory (University of Southampton): ‘Structural Rationality in Desire’

31 January, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Can desires be irrational? This paper focuses on the possibility that desires can be irrational in virtue of failing to cohere with other mental states of the person in question (including their other desires). Recent literature on structural irrationality has largely neglected structural requirements on desire, and this paper aims to remedy this neglect, not only to inform that literature,…

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February 2024

Choice Group Seminar by Brad Hooker (University of Reading): ‘Fittingness and Well-Being’

7 February, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This paper focuses on non-instrumental values that constitute positive contributions to well-being. The paper asks whether the things that constitute contributions to a person’s well-being involve relations of fittingness. Section 1 of the paper briefly considers the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being and its implications for whether the fittingness of attitudes (including emotions, desires, and beliefs) is a prudential good. Section…

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Choice Group Seminar by Richard Bradley (LSE): ‘Chance, Fairness and Dynamic Consistency’

14 February, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Discussion of the relationship between dynamic consistency and the Sure-thing principle has figured prominently in recent debate over the rationality of the kind of ambiguity aversion some display in the Ellsberg paradox; less so in the literature on the preference for fairness postulated by Diamond (1967). Yet both are instances of a preference for randomisation (respectively over events/states and over…

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Choice Group by Giacomo Giannini (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf): ‘Essential Dependence is not Fundamentality Inducing’

28 February, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: It is commonly thought that there is a very tight connection between essence, metaphysical dependence, and fundamentality. This often results in the endorsement of a principle linking Essence To Dependence (Fine 1994; Lowe 2006; Correia 2005; Koslicki 2012; Tahko and Lowe 2020) (ETD) x essentially depends on y iff y appears in x’s essence. And a principle linking Dependence To…

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March 2024

Choice Group Seminar by Lukas Beck (LSE) and Marcel Jahn (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin): ‘What is a Normative Model? Taking Justification Seriously’

6 March, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract:  In recent years, several authors have highlighted that models play an important but underappreciated role in ethics and other “normative disciplines.” In these fields, models serve, inter alia, as devices for characterizing, testing, and justifying normative claims. In short, they play quite diverse roles in normative inquiry. However, philosophers concerned with the use of models in normative inquiry have…

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Choice Group Seminar by Silvia Milano (LMU Munich/University of Exeter): ‘Recommender systems and epistemic polarisation’

13 March, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Recommender systems increasingly serve as essential tools to navigate vast expenses of information. Yet, their proliferation in our everyday lives has raised concern over their potential magnification of social polarisation through the creation of echo chambers and filter bubbles, the exact nature and influence of which has been controversial. If, when, and how recommender systems affect polarization remains an open…

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Choice Group Seminar by Richard Holton (University of Cambridge): ‘Frustration, Temptation, and the Different Faces of Commitment’

20 March, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Most philosophical discussions of self-control have focused on temptation: on what is needed to resist giving in to appealing alternatives. In contrast a body of work in neuroscience has focussed on when foragers give up on an existing task, and start looking for alternatives. It might seem that that these are just two sides of the same coin: to give…

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Choice Group Seminar by Kirstine La Cour (UCL) and Arlene Lo (LSE): TBD

27 March, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract and title coming soon... Kirstine La Cour is a Post Graduate Teaching Assistant at UCL. Arlene Lo is a PhD student at the LSE Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method. This event will take place in person on LSE’s campus. However, those unable to attend in person will have the option of taking part online. To join online just…

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May 2024

Choice Group Seminar by Cristian Larroulet Philippi (University of Cambridge): ‘Credences, values, and real-world policymaking: Assessing the Bayesian picture of scientific advice’

1 May, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: The argument from inductive risk (AIR) is commonly understood to imply that scientific advice necessarily involves non-epistemic values. Richard Jeffrey (1956) famously articulated not only an internal critique to AIR, but also (though more tentatively than current proponents) an alternative picture of scientific advice, which we call “the Bayesian picture of scientific advice”. The Bayesian picture contends that binary cognitive…

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Choice Group Seminar by Henrik Kugelberg (LSE): ‘Responsibility for algorithmic injustice’

8 May, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Algorithmic systems often produce unjust outputs. However, there is widespread disagreement over how this injustice should be understood, conceptualised, and measured. There is also disagreement over what kind of responsibility is appropriate for addressing the wrongs. This paper examines two prominent accounts for analysing algorithmic injustices: the local distributive model and the structural injustice framework. The former focuses on developing…

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Choice Group Seminar by Daniel Guillery (LSE): ‘Transport, movement, and equality: Private property and the justifiability of road systems’

15 May, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Roads (understood broadly as the public strips of land between parcels of private property that allow for the circulation of people and goods) are central to our ability to move from place to place. They are also highly dangerous and unequal places: the risks associated with travel through these spaces are substantial and usually very unequally distributed (as are the…

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Choice Group Seminar by Zhongwei Xu (LSE Philosophy) and Vita Kudryavtseva (LSE Philosophy)

22 May, 4:30 pm6:00 pm

Different location! SAL G.03. Campus map: https://www.lse.ac.uk/lse-information/campus-map Zhongwei Xu (LSE Philosophy): The Weight of Evidence, Counterfactual Resilience & Epistemic Luck Abstract: It has been well-established in the literature that credence backed by weightier evidence is more resilient to learning new evidence in the future. In this paper, I show that such credence is also more resilient counterfactually. It would have changed…

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Choice Group Seminar by Mike Otsuka (Rutgers University): ‘Equal chances versus equal outcomes: when are lotteries fair and justified?’

29 May, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: According to one potent challenge to the value and fairness of distribution by lot, the lottery chance of receiving a good is lacking in value or otherwise insignificant or irrelevant in comparison with actually receiving the good. To meet this challenge, I show in Section I that the far greater significance of receiving all of an undivided good needn’t undermine…

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June 2024

Choice Group Seminar by Darren Bradley (University of Leeds): ‘How to Lose Your Memory Without Losing Your Money: Shifty Epistemology and Dutch Strategies’

5 June, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: An objection to shifty epistemologies such as subject-sensitive invariantism is that it predicts that agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses. Bob Beddor (2021) argues that these guaranteed losses are not a symptom of irrationality, on the grounds that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being irrational. I agree that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being…

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Choice Group Seminar by Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge): ‘Are thick concepts admissible in science?’

12 June, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Some concepts - wellbeing, sustainability, resilience, inequality, mental health, even infrastructure – presuppose a value judgment. Philosophers call them thick for that reason. There is a lot of important knowledge to be had about phenomena denoted by thick concepts. But how should researchers handle them? I evaluate three options and articulate the underlying principles for choosing between them. The bottom…

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