Philosophy of Science

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    Margherita Harris (LSE): “Model Robustness: Schupbach’s Explanatory Account of Robustness Analysis to the Rescue?”

Margherita Harris (LSE): “Model Robustness: Schupbach’s Explanatory Account of Robustness Analysis to the Rescue?”

21 March 2022|

 

Margherita Harris (LSE): “Model Robustness: Schupbach’s Explanatory Account of Robustness Analysis to the Rescue?”

In science, obtaining a “robust” result is often seen as providing further support for a hypothesis. The Bayesian should have something to say about the logic underpinning this method of confirmation. Schupbach’s recent explanatory account (2018) of robustness analysis (RA) is a welcome attempt […]

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    Dennis Dieks (Utrecht): “Identical quantum particles as distinguishable objects”

Dennis Dieks (Utrecht): “Identical quantum particles as distinguishable objects”

22 November 2021|

 
Dennis Dieks (Utrecht): “Identical quantum particles as distinguishable objects”

Particles in classical physics are individuals that can be distinguished by identifying physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the “received view” is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) cannot be distinguished in this way. This standard view is problematic, though: not only is it at odds […]

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    Giacomo Giannini (LSE): “Relational Troubles: Structuralist Worries for an epistemology of powers-based modality.”

Giacomo Giannini (LSE): “Relational Troubles: Structuralist Worries for an epistemology of powers-based modality.”

9 November 2021|

 

 

Giacomo Giannini (LSE): “Relational Troubles: Structuralist Worries for an epistemology of powers-based modality.”

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality that grounds all modal truths in powers: all metaphysically possible and necessary truths are to be explained by pointing at some actual power, or absence thereof.

One of the most enticing and often cited reasons to endorse dispositionalism is that […]

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The Modern Mind (Forum)

16 June 2021|

The Modern Mind

We trace the development of our modern ideas about the mind, from the highly influential work of Descartes and the impact of Darwinian evolution to more recent accounts of the ‘extended’ mind and the enhancements made possible by new technologies. Why is Descartes so important? What changed with Darwin? And in what ways have technological advances […]

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Who’s a Good Boy? (Forum)

27 May 2021|

Who’s a Good Boy?

Do non-human animals have morals? Can chimpanzees tell right from wrong? Do dolphins think about what they ought to do? And can a dog really be good? Recent scientific work can shed light on these issues, but they also take us to the heart of two great philosophical questions: what does it mean to […]

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    James Wills (LSE): “Classical Particle Indistinguishability, Precisely.”

James Wills (LSE): “Classical Particle Indistinguishability, Precisely.”

24 May 2021|

 
James Wills (LSE): “Classical Particle Indistinguishability, Precisely.”

I present an analysis of classical particle indistinguishability as ‘observational indistinguishability’ in a certain mathematically precise sense. I will argue that this leads to three interesting and welcome consequences in the foundations of statistical mechanics: (1) The identification and resolution of shortcomings in the ongoing debate concerning the solution to the […]

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Alexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”

30 March 2021|

 

Alexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”

Most philosophers of science are realists. Most philosophers of science are, at least implicitly, empiricists. But, I argue, it is not reasonable to be both an empiricist and a realist, because empiricism is motivated by epistemological internalism and realism requires the rejection of internalism. Nor is instrumentalism a reasonable position. So an empiricist […]

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John Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”

29 March 2021|

 
John Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”

This paper criticizes the traditional philosophical account of the quantization of gauge theories and offers an alternative. On the received view, gauge theories resist quantization because they feature distinct mathematical representatives of the same physical state of affairs. This resistance is overcome by a sequence of ad hoc modifications, […]

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    Emily Adlam (Cambridge): “Generalized Probabilistic Theories as Structural Realism”

Emily Adlam (Cambridge): “Generalized Probabilistic Theories as Structural Realism”

8 March 2021|

 

Emily Adlam (Cambridge): “Generalized Probabilistic Theories as Structural Realism”

In the field of quantum foundations there is a thriving research programme which involves placing quantum mechanics in a wider space of operationally defined theories in order to gain insight into its structure. There are various existing philosophical analyses of this research framework, but most have a strongly instrumentalist […]

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    Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

16 February 2021|

 

Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

This paper presents a novel argument against the possibility of action at a distance, with realism about space-time topology as its main premise.

 

Ulrich Meyer is a Professor or Philosophy at Colgate University. His research interests include metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science and the philosophy of time.

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