Joe Roussos & Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm): “A Sceptical Puzzle for Bayesians”
Belief polarisation occurs when two agents’ posterior beliefs move farther away from one another with respect to the same proposition or set of propositions. Polarisation has traditionally been regarded as a failure of rationality, e.g., the result of cognitive biases influencing the belief states of at least […]
Margherita Harris (LSE): “Model Robustness: Schupbach’s Explanatory Account of Robustness Analysis to the Rescue?”
In science, obtaining a “robust” result is often seen as providing further support for a hypothesis. The Bayesian should have something to say about the logic underpinning this method of confirmation. Schupbach’s recent explanatory account (2018) of robustness analysis (RA) is a welcome attempt […]
Chloé de Canson (Groningen): “Why Subjectivism?”
Few philosophical positions are as unpopular as radical subjective Bayesianism. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I argue that what is at stake in the subjectivism/anti- subjectivism debate is not, as is commonly thought, which norms […]
Patricia Rich (Bayreuth): “Knowledge in Real-World Contexts: Not Glamorous, but Indispensable”
During the past few decades, many epistemologists have argued for and contributed to a paradigm shift which repositions knowledge as the central concept in epistemology and the fundamental explanatory and normative force. For example, knowledge has been argued to provide the normative standard for assertion and action, […]
Jessica Keiser (Leeds): “Linguistic Conventions and Language Change”
I argue that data about language change casts doubt on the following two theses of the Lewisian metasemantic picture: that the essential function of language is communication, and that people share a language in virtue of a common interest (namely, to achieve that particular function). I propose a novel metasemantic […]
Lisa Hecht (Stockholm): “Permissible Risk-Inclination in Other-regarding Choices”
Faced with two or more options, a decision-maker may choose a riskier option for herself even if this option does not maximize her expected utility. When it comes to other-regarding choices, it is less clear whether a decision-maker may permissibly choose a riskier option that does not maximize the expected […]
Dennis Dieks (Utrecht): “Identical quantum particles as distinguishable objects”
Particles in classical physics are individuals that can be distinguished by identifying physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the “received view” is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) cannot be distinguished in this way. This standard view is problematic, though: not only is it at odds […]
Wolfgang Schwarz (Edinburgh): “Believing Against the Evidence”
I will look at cases in which a proposition is supported by an agent’s evidence at an earlier time but not by their evidence at a later time, even though the agent does not receive any new information that is relevant to the proposition. In such a case, I argue, the […]
Giacomo Giannini (LSE): “Relational Troubles: Structuralist Worries for an epistemology of powers-based modality.”
Dispositionalism is the theory of modality that grounds all modal truths in powers: all metaphysically possible and necessary truths are to be explained by pointing at some actual power, or absence thereof.
One of the most enticing and often cited reasons to endorse dispositionalism is that […]
Susanna Siegel (Harvard): “The phenomenal public”
What modes of mentality can be used to grasp the idea of the ‘body politic’? A standard view is that within a polity, it is not possible to perceive the public – instead one has to imagine it. I argue that this view is wrong in letter but may be correct in […]
Gallery
Gallery
Gallery
Connect with us
Facebook
Twitter
Youtube
Flickr