Decision Theory and Social Choice

How AI Challenges Prudential Regulation

5 August 2024|

Decision-makers are sensitive to uncertainty. Prudential regulation in finance is a good example. In general, the more uncertain a financial institution is about its risk exposures, the more capital it needs to hold. But what if a financial institution is uncertain about how uncertain it is about its risks? LSE Philosophy PhD student Kangyu Wang argues that the […]

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    Names that contain multitudes – Why policymakers should care about objects of credence

Names that contain multitudes – Why policymakers should care about objects of credence

20 May 2024|

How individuals and groups are named and designated is inextricably linked to the expected outcomes of policy decisions aimed at influencing them. Discussing her recent work on these ‘objects of credence’, LSE Philosophy Professor Anna Mahtani suggests that an attentiveness to the plurality of possible designators can help policymakers be more aware of the underlying choices inherent to […]

Dementia and its handmaids

29 February 2024|

Many people have a period of dementia before they die. Indeed, dementia has been identified as the leading cause of death in the UK. The diseases that cause dementia are often described as cruel: typically they slowly erode a person’s memories, knowledge, understanding, and eventually the ability to talk, walk and swallow. LSE Philosophy […]

Dementia, decision-making, and changing selves

5 December 2023|

Philosopher Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol) shares his personal thoughts on changing selves and reflects on our latest Philosophy Live event ‘Dementia and decision-making: How should we make decisions with – or on behalf of – those with dementia?’

Ten years ago, I was trying to decide whether or not to adopt a child and become a parent. I […]

Daniel Ellsberg: Real Life Decision Theory

27 June 2023|

The world recently lost Daniel Ellsberg, famous for leaking the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Ellsberg will be remembered within philosophy for a paradox in decision theory. Nikhil Venkatesh explores the connection between this paradox and his momentous decision to leak the Papers.

Ellsberg’s Life

Many philosophers have put themselves on the wrong side of the authorities. At the birth of […]

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    Lives v livelihoods: Evaluating policies to address COVID-19

Lives v livelihoods: Evaluating policies to address COVID-19

21 October 2020|

Policies that suppress or control COVID-19 prevent illness and save lives, but exact an economic toll. How should we balance lives and livelihoods to determine which policy is best? Richard Bradley, Alex Voorhoeve et al. compare benefit-cost and social welfare approaches to the pandemic.

Immunity Testing: Our passport out of lockdown?

2 June 2020|

Immunity testing has been touted as one of the best ways to escape lockdown, but just how accurate will these tests have to be? Richard Bradley and Liam Kofi Bright look at inductive risk and policy-making during the pandemic.

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    Is Brexit the will of the people? The answer is not quite that simple

Is Brexit the will of the people? The answer is not quite that simple

16 April 2019|

Christian List looks at majoritarianism, Condorcet’s paradox and the UK’s decision to leave the EU.

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    Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 2: Indexicals and Vagueness

Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 2: Indexicals and Vagueness

9 May 2017|

In her second post in this series, Anna Mahtani explores the parallels between philosophy of language and decision theory’s treatment of indexicals and vagueness.

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    Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 1: Credences and Preferences

Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 1: Credences and Preferences

13 March 2017|

Decision theorists and philosophers of language have a lot to learn from one another. In this post, Anna Mahtani looks at the use and interpretation of credences and preferences.