LSE Philosophy Fellow Wesley Wrigley wrote an article for the online iai magazine by the Institute of Art and Ideas about the Penrose’s Gödelian Argument.

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems shook the foundations of mathematics, revealing its inherent limitations. These discoveries are now among the most significant in the field and have inspired various philosophical viewpoints. One influential perspective, proposed by Nobel Prize-winning physicist Sir Roger Penrose, is that Gödel’s theorems prove the mind is not a computer. However, LSE philosopher and logician Wesley Wrigley argues against Penrose, asserting that Gödel’s theorems do not imply the mind is non-computational. Join Wes as he demystifies the Penrose argument and explains why, despite Penrose’s brilliance, it is a mistake to claim on the basis of the incompleteness theorems that the mind cannot be implemented by a computer.

Link to the article.