CLIMATE IGNORANCE AND IMAGINATION

Moving climate discourse from stasis to praxis by analysing how resources for judgement facilitate or limit imagination and the constraining influence of structural 'non-knowings'

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ABSTRACT

Despite an active media landscape replete with climate facts and content advocating for climate action, we face a climate impasse where radical responses commensurate with the scale of the climate crisis have not yet transpired. Through a multimodal critical discourse analysis of climate-focused resources for judgement circulating in the contemporary mediapolis, this study interrogates the purchase of imagination in taking effective climate action and the obstacles that stand in the way. Building on Hannah Arendt's (2006) political conception of imagination as the root of both lying and acting, I explore how these divergent paths manifest within discursive contestation around how we should respond to the climate crisis. By connecting Arendt's understanding of the power of lies and the political impotency of facts to the study of agnotology (Proctor, 2008), which considers ignorance as a powerful active construction, I reveal new contours to the apathy, lack of political will and conventional common-sense that contribute to climate stasis. From this, I propose climate ignorance as a form of structural non-knowing that emerges from and acts to protect systems of power and privilege linked to an extractivist ideology.

On the side of action, my analysis rests on Silverstone's (2007) vision for a quality mediapolis, where resources for judgement are key to facilitating the capacity for imagination in the public sphere. This relies on media producers fulfilling their responsibility to provide audiences with proper distance, intersubjectivity and expansive conceptual horizons within an agonistic space of competing narratives. By analysing a corpus of texts produced by organisations within the institutional regime of Climate Inc. around the time period of COP28, my research elucidates how climate media facilitates or limits the capacity for imagination and the extent to which these efforts are constrained by climate ignorance. My results expose a widespread embrace of discourses of objectivity and universality that utilise fact-forward and expertise-driven narratives, eliding complexity, contestation and plurality. Lacking in reflexivity or acknowledgement, these resources for judgement adhere to 'if only' logic and hegemonic assumptions, avoiding recognition of past conceptual constraints that have historically impeded climate progress. Based on these findings, I conclude that climate media is being constrained by climate ignorance, which is limiting the imaginative capacity to move from climate stasis to climate praxis.

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INTRODUCTION

The history of climate change is a history of climate ignorance. On one level, climate change is explained by simple scientific facts known for over a hundred and fifty years (Arrhenius and Holden, 1897; Tyndall, 1861). Greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, trap atmospheric heat and warm the planet; and the temperate climate of the last 11,000 years has facilitated the flourishing of human society, making us vulnerable to climatic instability. Given these facts, one would imagine that if we knew our activities were causing increasing levels of greenhouse gases and thus global heating, we would quickly change course. Spoiler alert: this has not happened. Instead, humans have changed the chemistry of our air (Oreskes and Conway, 2008: 55) in ways that threaten our own existence, along with multitudes of other species, and though we now know that we are doing this, we carry on. Each successive decade since the 1990s brings higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and, as predicted, warmer global temperatures (World Meteorological Organization, 2023). The crux of the intractability of climate change lies in the source of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases; if these gases were discovered to be emanating from a certain species of tree, it is easy to imagine they would have all been cut down without delay. Instead, rising carbon dioxide levels are primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels, an activity so thoroughly embedded in modern ways of living that it could be said 'we live inside a carbon world' (Wapner, 2016: 1). The oil, coal, and gas sectors—as well as cement, agricultural and other industries (Ritchie, 2020)—that emit these heat-trapping gases have made some people, corporations, and countries very rich and very powerful. These wealthy, dominant entities are currently and historically complicit in the changing climate and any action taken to avert the crisis threatens their positions. With such privilege at stake, ignorance can be preferable to knowledge.

Over my decade of working in climate communications, I have witnessed a dramatic growth in climate consciousness as extreme weather events have become more frequent, activists like Greta Thunberg have gained celebrity status and media coverage has surged around major climate conferences. Indeed, 2023 public opinion research shows that the majority of the world is aware, worried and thinks that climate change should be a high priority for governments (Leiserowitz et al., 2023). Yet the radical transformations we hoped for have not transpired. We are caught in 'a troubling cul-de-sac in which the efforts may be multiplying and gaining greater public acceptance, but are also circling around, what is essentially, a political dead-end' (Wapner, 2016: 4). Throughout my hundreds

of interviews with climate experts, policymakers, and activists, I have heard the same refrain: we have the solutions, we have the money, but what we need is the political will. Thus, much of the climate communications material in the public sphere focuses on how to spark this elusive will to act. Social media platforms are inundated with content making the case for why we need urgent ambitious action, particularly around the annual UN Climate Change Conferences of Parties (COPs); yet the arguments seem tired and familiar, and the climate impasse persists.

Despite a global demand for climate action, debates around what climate action actually means are constrained by a variety of obfuscation efforts, which have evolved in alignment with public opinion. Where climate denialism was once the main concern for climate advocates, now 'climatewashing' (Munshi and Kurian, 2021) and 'climate delayism' (Supran, 2021) run rampant, often cloaked in shiny veneers of purported sustainability and solidarity from corporations and governments. Within my own world of well-intentioned climate advocates, the pressure to produce media content drives a 'modality of visibility as an end-goal' (Jiménez-Martínez and Edwards, 2023: 21) and calls for further research 'can play out as prevarication' (Proctor, 2008: 20). Akin to the development of 'popular feminism' (Banet-Weiser et al., 2020), the popularisation of climate action is intertwined with a depoliticisation of the movement, where commitments, rather than tangible progress, are framed as success and a focus on carbon footprints distracts from effective policy by shifting the onus from producers to consumers (Schendler, 2021). Across the media landscape, climate action as political agency appears to be morphing into #ClimateAction as visibility (Jiménez-Martínez and Edwards, 2023). This research project emerges from my desire to understand why we are doing so little when we know so much. It analyses how climate media producers could move from a position of climate stasis to climate praxis by facilitating the imaginative capacity to spark effective climate action. If Silverstone is correct that imagination 'opens the doors to understanding and in turn to the capacity to make judgements in and through the public world' (2007: 46), then its role in shifting the climate impasse we currently face must be explored.

THEORETICAL CHAPTER

Literature review

The political role of imagination

Imagination is more apt to be associated with children's books than the political domain, but Hannah Arendt saw it as an intrinsic characteristic of being human, affording us the 'ability to conceive that things may be different' (Cronin, 2018: 112). Imagination is directly linked to understanding one's place in the world as it gives us the capacity to put things in perspective, moving what is close to us farther away so that we can see it clearly and bringing what is remote within personal reach (Arendt, 1994: 323). Arendt considered this 'enlarged mentality' as key to human judgement, opening up imaginative pathways for us to hold multiple standpoints in our minds and empathically embody other people's positions, facilitating conclusions that are interdependent, representative, inferential and, therefore, more valid. Conversely, a lack of imagination leads to failures of judgement and decisions that revolve solely around private interests (2006: 237). Thus, 'Imagination is not a luxury or a privilege, but a necessity' (Medina, 2013: 269). Given imagination's role in perspective, judgements and action, it is integral to the political process of reconciling divergent interests, standpoints and values (Coleman, 2018: 162). Arendt argues that any act attempting to change some aspect of the world is political (2006: 253) and that social change would not be possible without the ability to imagine how things could be different (1971: 31). Climate change, thus, is an inherently political issue with its most intractable aspects currently revolving around how to respond to the crisis rather than the problem itself, fitting with Coleman's understanding of politics as emerging from contestations over meaning (2018: 168). He contends that political disagreement generally focuses not on whether a phenomenon has occurred but rather what it means to the people impacted (2018: 163) and, consequently, what action is needed in response.

Imagination is seen as a cyclical socio-cultural phenomenon by Zittoun and Gillespie, with people and society guiding imagination and imagination shaping them in return, alternately expanding or limiting the boundaries of human possibility and common sense (2016: 58). They view imagination as bonding the personal to the social and connecting past, present and future in a complex and socially shared dialogical process (2016: 71). This social imaginative dimension puts current choices into historical context, revealing patterns in the 'larger arc of collective experience' and elucidating

new political possibilities for the present (Mills, 1959, as cited in Wapner, 2016: 5). Such imaginative capacity is seen by feminist scholar Zerilli as the remedy to conceptually expand her field (1998: 443) but that a 'problem of the will' stands in the way, constraining worldviews within hegemonic frames of reference (1998: 449).

Although the will to act in response to the climate crisis with commensurate urgency appears to be lacking, simply declaring 'the will' as missing does not necessarily expose what could shift it. Wapner rejects this 'if only we had the will to act' framing and instead blames the climate impasse on a failure of imagination (2016: 2). He argues that climate inertia exists in an 'if only' state, where action would be possible if we only had more time, enhanced dedication or stronger momentum (2016: 2). Imagination potentiates a 'what if' lens that is fundamental in shifting this stasis: first, by fostering reflexivity and liberating practitioners from common sense boundaries; second, by illuminating the conceptual constraints that have limited climate discourse and policy; and third, in envisioning new paradigms that can subvert existing power structures and open up alternate avenues for collective action (Wapner, 2016: 5). These are steps in acknowledging and taking responsibility for failures of the past, which have resulted not only in constrained imaginative horizons but also in the prolongation of historical societal harms and exclusions (Medina, 2013: 278). In the sphere of climate action, these restrictive paradigmatic boundaries have been reinforced by legacies of lying and doubt-mongering (Oreskes and Conway, 2008), which Arendt would contend are also reliant on imagination. She conceives of imagination as being constitutive of both acting and lying: 'the ability to lie, the deliberate denial of factual truth, and the capacity to change facts, the ability to act, are interconnected; they owe their existence to the same source, imagination' (1971: 31). This dichotomy is at the forefront of climate discourse, where most communication practices and advocacy campaigns are deployed either to obscure the facts of climate change or to educate people of the facts, in the belief that knowing more will inspire the will to act.

The inflexibility (and political impotency) of facts

From James Hansen's seminal 1988 congressional testimony (Holthaus, 2018) to Al Gore's infamous PowerPoint presentations in An Inconvenient Truth (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2024) to Greta Thunberg's calls to 'unite behind the science' (Ortiz, 2019), scientific facts have provided the foundation for climate advocacy. However, stating facts does not necessarily lead to action; rather, it can enable acceptance of the status quo (Arendt, 2006: 246). While asserting that factual truth does

inform political decision-making, Arendt questions the ability of facts to withstand the reactionary 'onslaught of power' (2006: 227), as any set of facts that opposes a group's profit or preference is vulnerable to being targeted by that group (2006: 231). Deception is easy and tempting, as the liar can prepare a 'story for public consumption with a careful eye to making it credible, whereas reality has the disconcerting habit of confronting us with the unexpected for which we were not prepared' (Arendt, 1971: 32).

Responses to the inconvenient reality of climate change, unprecedented in geographic and temporal scale, jeopardise economic and power structures built on over a century of extractive practices. Additionally, climate action threatens to upend the free market and 'extractivist' (Alcoff, 2022) ideologies that underpin modern lifestyles and systems (Oreskes and Conway, 2008: 77), leaving certain groups with much to defend. Echoing Arendt, Oreskes and Conway observe that when the scientific facts of climate change challenged their worldviews, these groups responded by disputing those facts (2008: 80) rather than re-examining their worldviews. To protect profits, power and ideology, they have spent decades strategically deploying lies to spread climate denial and doubt (Oreskes and Conway, 2008), effectively stymying climate action. This type of 'organised lying', as Arendt dubs it (1971: 32), is dynamic and evolves to match the audience's expectations: the narrative adopted by The Marshall Institute, a conservative think tank in the U.S., provides multiple entry points by arguing, 'there is no proof that global warming is real or, if it is real, that there is no proof that it is caused by human activities or, if it is real and anthropogenic, that there is no proof that it matters' (Oreskes and Conway, 2008: 60).

With the texture of facts 'always in danger of being perforated by single lies or torn to shreds by the organised lying of groups, nations, or classes, or denied and distorted' (Arendt, 1971: 32), the power of factual truth is limited in public and political realms (Arendt, 2006: 223). However, this vulnerability is intertwined with immense resilience; the unchanging stubborn nature of facts gives them a stability that can outlive power structures. As Arendt posits, 'persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it' (2006: 255). The lies circulated by corporations and politicians do not become reality but rather proliferate a kind of make-believe (Arendt, 2006: 254), while the Earth's climate continues to uphold the facts by changing in ways predicted by science (Sinclair, 2018). In recent years, the make-believe has shifted to align with growing public awareness (Munshi and Kurian, 2021; Supran, 2021). Early stages of organised lying questioned whether climate

change was real or even mattered. Now, obfuscation targets the responses to climate change, protecting the status quo by replacing the public's 'concern for the common good in political debates with a concern for vested interests, while misrepresenting those interests to both the public and to policymakers as the common good' (Edwards, 2021: 169, emphasis in original). Even concerned citizens and self-proclaimed climate advocates can be taken in by such lies; it may be easier to choose the fantasy when facts present a frightening landscape of climate crisis that demands fundamentally transforming modern lifestyles. Indeed, those spreading lies can be deceived by their own make-believe in a twist that Arendt muses might be worse for both the world and the liars themselves (2006: 249). She describes this 'modern art of self-deception' as turning outside issues into inside issues (2006: 251), which shifts the focus from the external landscape of deception to the internal dimension of non-knowing. There are myriad ways to not know and these various forms of ignorance—whether conscious, unconscious, or structural—are just as worthy of examination as the facts they avoid, block and obscure (Proctor, 2008: 10).

To know or not to know, that is the question

The opposite of factual and rational truth (Arendt, 2006: 228), ignorance can be as powerful as knowledge (Smithson, 1985 as cited in Sammut and Sartawi, 2012: 182). The concept of 'agnotology' illuminates ignorance as an active construction with political impact (Proctor, 2008: 5). Proctor's framework includes three dimensions of ignorance, which I will use to clarify different forms of non-knowing about climate change. The first, 'native state', captures instances of an 'originary' deficiency of knowledge that acts as a prompt to inform and educate (2008: 11–12). In the climate sphere, this manifests in situations where people unaware of climate change are willing to learn. The next variant, 'lost realm' describes inattention that ignores some things over others, recognising 'that ignorance, like knowledge, has a political geography' (2008: 13–14). This explicates phenomena where deniers refuse to accept the truth even when presented with growing evidence as well as people aware of climate change who continue to live as if it does not pertain to their lives. As Proctor contends, ignorance can be easily maintained once certain things have been made unknown through suppression or apathy (2008: 15). The final dimension, 'strategic ploy', focuses on the construction and manipulation of doubt and uncertainty to actively produce ignorance (2008: 15–16), aligning with Arendt's concept of 'organised lying' and the fossil fuel industry playbook that actively misleads the public (Oreskes and Conway, 2008). When groups are trapped in these states of ignorance, they are

unable to imagine certain meanings, certain possibilities, certain pasts or futures, which results in them becoming cognitively, affectively and imaginatively numbed (Medina, 2013: 267), a condition often perceived as widespread disinterest or apathy (Proctor, 2008: 24). As it inhibits imaginative desire for unwelcome or unexpected truths, which is a constituent element of sound political judgement (Coleman, 2018: 163), structural ignorance is in direct opposition to Arendt's 'expanded mentality' (2006: 237).

Proctor's framework, useful in illuminating the layers of ignorance that exist around climate change, does not fully explore how ignorance protects power and privilege. I turn to feminist theory and critical race theory for insight into how 'privileged group ignorance' operates (Mills, 2008: 235). Mills describes 'white ignorance' as perpetuating systems of domination based on race by ignoring the 'long history of structural discrimination' responsible for distributing superior resources and opportunities to white populations (2008: 240). 'White group interests', directly responsible for the generation and maintenance of white ignorance (2008: 245), are the outcome of a society 'structured by relations of domination and subordination' (2008: 236). This confines conceptual and imaginative horizons to the biases of dominating groups and results in pervasive common sense leading to 'motivated irrationality', where people who hold no conscious prejudice will still be 'cognitively disabled' when developing judgements and establishing truths (2008: 239). In the domain of climate change, I contend that the group interests of extractors and polluters are driving and sustaining a corresponding kind of 'climate ignorance'. Just as white ignorance produces and perpetuates racist structures, climate ignorance enables systems of 'extractivism' (Alcoff, 2022) viewing both people and planet as resources to be exploited and eliding historic trends of colonial domination. Such 'convenient amnesia about the past and its legacy in the present' (Mills, 2008: 246) protects the privilege to pursue extractive practices while denying any relationship between current states of wealth or power and the changing climate. This purposeful ignorance underlies the attitudes of many governments and corporations as well as citizens of rich countries, whose comfortable modern lifestyles are rooted in national legacies of extracting resources from the planet and other people. As long as these structural non-knowings hold, those that were extracted from continue to be marginalised, oppressed and ignored by dominant systems (Medina, 2013: 278).

O'Neill's conception of 'male ignorance'—'a structure of concerted if unconscious epistemic occlusion which both stems from and serves to protect male privilege' (2022: 490)—further elucidates an

understanding of climate ignorance, revealing additional contours of embodiment and positioned awareness. O'Neill considers 'who does not know, does not need to know and, indeed, needs not to know' (2022: 505, emphasis in original) as layers of non-knowing that are contextual and non-exclusive; depending on the positionality of the individual or group and the situation they find themselves in, these embodied states can occur together or separately. For example, a man in a patriarchal society may not be attuned to instances of gendered sexual harassment, excusing him from knowing or needing to know about such acts as they do not directly impact him. A man committing harassment, in an act of self-deception similar to Arendt's liars (2006: 249), may need to stay ignorant of the violence of his behaviour to keep his identity, ideology and privilege intact. Conversely, women who are subordinated within this same structure of male domination will 'know more and know more accurately' because their position necessitates it (O'Neill, 2022: 494). This aligns with my framework of climate ignorance, as those who have been marginalised by extractive power structures—poor and vulnerable populations, people of colour, youth, indigenous peoples—are generally more aware of the urgency of climate change due to their othered positions. Meanwhile, the collective interests of groups holding power and privilege within these structures—wealthy nations, oil companies, financial institutions, citizens of the Global North—are protected and maintained by layers of non-knowing. Often operating unconsciously, these forms of ignorance are not simply incidental but imperative to safeguarding existing power structures (O'Neill, 2022: 497).

These forms of structural ignorance share a resistance to change as they actively, sometimes violently, shield themselves from potential ideological threats (O'Neill, 2022: 498), namely anti-racism, feminism and climate action. While O'Neill draws on Mills' understanding of 'white ignorance' to explicate her conception of 'male ignorance', she carefully explains she is not indicating that gender and race are the same (2022: 494). Similarly, I do not suggest an equivalence with the extractive structures maintained by 'climate ignorance'. Rather, I aim to illuminate consistent patterns in the production and maintenance of structural ignorance to uphold forms of domination, revealing that climate ignorance is part of a wider phenomenon. Future research could examine the cross-overs between the primary non-knowers of these three types of ignorance, as extractivism and colonialism have historically depended on the actions of white men whose 'refusal to perceive systemic discrimination' (Mills, 2008: 246) has protected and perpetuated their perpetration; however, this is beyond the scope of my current study.

I argue that the concept of climate ignorance may elucidate previously discussed challenges prolonging the climate impasse. First, climate ignorance may contribute to 'the problem of the will' by cognitively and experientially disabling people's imaginative capacity, blocking the motivation to reflect on, make judgements about or take action on climate change. Second, climate ignorance may explain some publics' receptivity to deception, for if the truth of climate change threatens your privilege, it is easier to not know by believing fantasies over facts; fantasies that may resonate more powerfully than the truth with your worldview, shaped as it is by unconscious non-knowings. And finally, the ignorance that is constructed in avoidance of climate facts demands an alternate story to keep the non-knowing in place, which drives imaginative potency towards lying over acting. O'Neill asserts that instead of looking to knowledge as the antidote to ignorance, a transformative form of knowing is needed and 'we should not underestimate the purchase of imagination' (2022: 506). This leads me to interrogate the relationship between structural ignorance and imagination: what is the effect of ignorance on imaginative capacity and what is the utility of imagination in overcoming ignorance? For this, it is important to examine the mediated public arena in which climate ignorance is produced and challenged, where facts and lies are disseminated and where imagination is harnessed to construct the materiality of the world (Silverstone, 2007: 31).

The mediapolis and effective resources for judgement

The contestation of ignorance versus imagination and lying versus acting occurs within 'the mediapolis', described by Silverstone as 'the mediated space of appearance' that constitutes the world in all of 'its worldliness' and facilitates dialogue between agonistic discourses, forming the basis for a new public sphere at the centre of contemporary political life (2007: 31, 49). He considered the media in this arena to mediate between the quotidian 'of everyday life and the world which is spatially and temporally beyond immediate reach' (2007: 46), resonating with climate discourse that tries to make the remoteness of climate change feel urgent and personal. Silverstone's vision of a quality mediapolis rests on three pillars: the provision of effective 'resources for judgement', perspective-taking that utilises 'proper distance' and a shared sense of responsibility that is distributed equally, albeit differently, across producers, audiences, and subjects (2007: 44). Effective resources for judgement enable the public to think reflexively, gain perspective and make sound cognitive and moral judgements in the world (Silverstone, 2007: 52). Like Arendt, Silverstone considered facts to be

insufficient resources for judgement and imagination to be fundamental (2007: 46); without imagination, there is a lack of judgement that leads to the failure of independent thought and collapse of the political and public realms (2007: 45). Such judgements are imperative around contested and complex political phenomena like climate change, where meaning is being ascribed (Coleman, 2018: 158) and responses need societal backing. Although Silverstone calls on us to find ways of ensuring that the mediapolis works in favour of humanity rather than against (2007: 33), he recognises that the current circulation of media includes both benevolent and malevolent resources for judgement (2007: 49). The latter encompasses the varied facets of organised lying previously discussed, which are attuned to arrangements of structural ignorance in their target audiences and 'fit without seam, crack, or fissure, exactly as the facts fitted into their own original context', making them not only adequate substitutes for reality (Arendt, 2006: 249) but preferred substitutes as they hold the necessary non-knowings in place. Such deceptive resources for judgement have been described in much detail (Oreskes and Conway, 2008; Supran and Oreskes, 2017), thus this research focuses on the well-intentioned media producers 'who have put their noses to the grindstone' (Wapner, 2016: 1) but, despite all efforts to design discursive strategies that persuade the public of the urgency of climate action, have not yet jumpstarted us out of stasis.

The climate impasse is not due to inactivity (Wapner, 2016: 1); there is a bustling contemporary climate mediapolis which comprises part of a 'routinised system of response that has evolved to address climate change', dubbed by Wapner as 'Climate Inc.' (2016: 2). He posits that the efforts of Climate Inc. align with existing cultural, political and economic practices and determine the 'paradigmatic boundaries for thinking', actively working against imagination by not questioning conventional common sense (2016: 3). Emerging from the institutional world of hegemonic policymaking and development logic, Climate Inc. promotes narratives, solutions and responses that match established understandings of climate action and protect existing privilege from the upheaval of radical transformation. In disseminating a global climate discourse that assumes universality, Climate Inc. 'enables epistemic domination and the silencing of local voices' (Castro-Sotomayor, 2019: 7). These discursive strategies mirror what Coleman has observed within the media more generally (2018: 164), where experts are deployed to deliver fact-forward discourses of objectivity that elide felt experience (2018: 161) and present contested issues like climate change as phenomena to be 'explained as incontrovertible truths' (2018: 159). This content, dogmatically loyal to facts despite their political impotency, is disseminated throughout the mediapolis to audiences that, as Coleman describes, have

'trained their imaginations to stay at home…[and] use the media less as a window on the world than a shield against ideological disturbance' (2018: 163). Rather than facilitating imaginative capacity, resources for judgement emanating from the constricted discursive space of Climate Inc. appear to reinforce climate ignorance, helping to keep imaginations 'at home' and buffer audiences' minds from engagement with the world.

Facilitating the capacity for imagination

So how can we break through the current climate impasse if it is not due to a lack of activity but rather a flurry of imaginatively constrained activity, inhibited by climate ignorance? Medina proposes a paradigm of 'radical solidarity' that embraces a 'politics of acknowledgement', extending our imaginative and conceptual horizons to include other lives and possibilities, even those that conflict with our own experience (2013: 267). While the international climate negotiations (COPs) associated with Climate Inc. are structured by consensus, Medina eschews the dialectic of agreement versus disagreement by contending that acknowledgement is more crucial to plurality than consensus (2013: 281). The deep sense of plurality potentiated through Medina's 'politics of acknowledgement' mirrors Silverstone's conception of 'proper distance', which brings close the experiences of others—other humans, nonhumans and past or future iterations of others—while putting our own experiences in perspective (Silverstone, 2007: 47). This sense of things 'both close and far' aligns with Arendt's idea of proper perspective, which also elucidates both our commonality and differences with others (Arendt, 1994: 323; Silverstone, 2007: 48). As the final pillar of a quality mediapolis, proper distance engenders understanding, responsibility and duty of care that extends beyond ourselves and our group (2007: 44).

For this 'mediated enlargement of mentality' (Silverstone, 2007: 48) to provide the foundation for human judgement, as Arendt (2006) contends it does, a state of 'intersubjectivity' must be present, allowing for the imaginative receptiveness to other perspectives external to ourselves and our group (Coleman, 2018: 162). This requires grounding communication in 'a feeling for the world, and in the condition of being in the world among others' (Silverstone, 2007: 43) rather than in discourses of objectivity or universality. The process of 'intersubjective judgement', facilitated by effective resources for judgement (Silverstone, 2007: 44) but disrupted by organised lying (Edwards, 2021: 170), necessitates a 'painful, messy, multivocal commitment to working through contested historical experience' (Coleman, 2018: 168–169). To negotiate the 'contested historical experience' of climate

change demands acknowledging the legacies of extractivism that underpin climate ignorance as well as recognising conceptual constraints that have historically derailed climate policy and action (Wapner, 2016: 4–5). This resonates with the transformative, intersubjective state of knowing that for O'Neill could dismantle structural non-knowings (2022: 506). Such embodied imagination is foundational to forming coherent identities and expanding conceptual horizons through acts of temporal continuity (Medina, 2013). Beyond futural envisioning, imagination is fundamental to remembering the past and fostering a shared sense of responsibility that is both forward- and backward-looking (Medina, 2013: 251), which grounds our present in the context of all that came before and connects to the myriad possibilities of the future.

Conceptual framework and research objectives

My conceptual framework, based on the literature reviewed above, explores the political role of imagination in shaping our responses to climate change. Despite the recent surge of climate media and the plethora of climate facts and knowledge available to us, our collective response does not yet match the scale or urgency of the climate crisis. The obvious question is, why not? My approach is anchored in Arendt's contention that imagination is constitutive of both lying and acting (1971: 31), following these disparate paths to understand their development in the climate sphere. The fundamental importance of imagination in gaining proper perspective, making intersubjective judgement and expanding conceptual horizons to open up new paradigms for action within the contested political context of climate solutions is on one side. On the other rests the imaginative potential of lies and fantasy to construct and uphold climate ignorance, as well as the impotency of facts to overcome these structural non-knowings. Climate obfuscation includes a variety of tributaries that range from strategic organised lying to unconscious self-deception and make-believe, all stemming from and serving to protect the privilege of those who have historically benefitted from extractive practices and the wealth and power they generate (O'Neill, 2022: 490). These forms of structural non-knowing are agentic, working to resist change, uphold hegemonic logic, perpetuate structures of domination and numb the cognitive and imaginative capacity to effectively respond to climate change. Considering the global climate discourse disseminated by Climate Inc., the balance appears skewed towards lying rather than acting, resulting in globally pervasive climate ignorance, except within groups that have been historically marginalised by the power structures this ignorance protects, such as indigenous peoples and youth, who have long been ringing the climate alarm bell.

Applying this conceptual framework within the context of the mediapolis—where climate solutions are proposed and contested, narratives and stories are circulated, and judgements are made about how to respond to the climate crisis—reveals questions about the efficacy of climate-focused resources for judgement that media producers are providing to audiences. By examining the circulation of contemporary media texts in the mediapolis, I hope to identify how current discursive strategies utilised by Climate Inc. organisations work to facilitate or limit the public's imaginative capacity, and the extent to which their efforts are constrained by forms of structural ignorance. Thus, my research questions are:

> RQ1: How do contemporary climate-focused resources for judgement currently circulating in the mediapolis facilitate or limit the capacity for imagination?

> RQ2: To what extent are these resources for judgement constrained by the production of climate ignorance as a form of structural 'non-knowing'?

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

My methodology encompasses the theoretical foundation developed in my previous chapter, as 'we cannot so sharply separate theory and method' (Fairclough, 2023: 15). While they inhabit different chapters, the interdependent relationship between theory and analysis demands a more iterative approach; analysis must be 'grounded in actual instances of language' and theory is needed to 'move the analysis of discourse beyond instance' (Schiffrin et al., 2001: 7). Connecting my theoretical assumptions to empirical observations, I have chosen a research pathway (Meyer, 2001: 2) that utilises multimodal critical discourse analysis (MCDA). This is part of a broader research methodology following Fairclough's renewed critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach that 'starts from discourse, and moves to how social reality should be changed', shifting from problem to explanation to solution through a series of stages (Fairclough, 2023: 21). I tackled the first stage in my theoretical chapter by focusing on climate inaction as a social wrong and using a trans-disciplinary theoretical process to construct objects of research, namely climate ignorance and imagination (Fairclough, 2023: 16). Stage two emerged as I identified semiotic dimensions of the obstacles to climate action and proposed the mediapolis as a discursive space where the dialectical relationship between semiosis and social

change could be analysed (Fairclough, 2023: 16). The remaining steps of stage two involve choosing a corpus of texts and carrying out my analysis, which unfold in the following chapters. Stage three considers the ideological dimensions of discourse and 'whether the social order "needs" the social wrong' (Fairclough, 2023: 17), which is deliberated in relation to the constraints of climate ignorance that appear in my findings. Although the final stage of moving from explanation to action extends beyond the remit of my research, I begin to address it in my conclusion by discussing potential ways that media producers can overcome the discursive and ideological challenges my analysis elucidates to facilitate the imaginative capacity necessary for effective climate action.

Methodological rationale

Through MCDA, this research considers digital communication materials circulating in the mediapolis that provide the public with resources to make judgements about how we should respond to the climate crisis. Given the persuasive nature of this discursive space, and indeed all discourse (Gill, 1996: 143), it is fitting to harness discourse analysis's capacity to study the 'strategies of persuasion' (Rose, 2023: 221). As the affordances of digital media allow texts to articulate meaning across various modes, such as image and video (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 41), this research demands a multimodal approach which moves beyond analytical frameworks focusing only on linguistic dimensions of discourse (Jones et al., 2015: 1). Following Fairclough's 'broad and non-restrictive' characterisation of discourse (2013b: 23), the multimodal context of my research fits within a critical lens. Indeed, my theoretical foundation demands a critical approach to reveal the conventional common sense and hegemonic assumptions underlying my corpus and analyse how these preserve existing ideology, power and privilege (Fairclough, 2013b: 2). In reading between the lines of a text to illuminate the articulation and dissemination of ideology (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 16), CDA can help to recognise the origins of social wrongs, what keeps them in place and potential avenues around such obstacles (Fairclough, 2023: 15). My intent with this research is to gain understanding of how global climate discourse may be complicit in the climate impasse and identify the agnotological constraints and ineffective discursive strategies that are preventing media producers from shifting into a position of praxis. By integrating theory, analysis and interpretation, CDA 'can be a part of and contribute to such a praxis' (Fairclough, 2013a: 21).

Sampling strategy

In outlining his concept of the mediapolis, Silverstone acknowledged that the digital revolution might change the technological landscape he envisioned (2007: 41); this was in 2007, when Facebook had been open to non-college students for only a year (Devarakonda, 2022). Now, Facebook claims over three billion users (Statista, 2024) and in this time period, the exponential growth of social media has transformed the mediation of public life. The 'electronically communicated public speech and action' of the mediapolis that Silverstone described (2007: 31) can currently be found on social media in multimodal forms of discourse that increasingly claim dominance in public communication (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 3). For these reasons and to ensure the feasibility of my study, I limited my sample to resources for judgement appearing on public social media channels, relying on my research questions to guide my sampling strategy (Pihlaja, 2022: 68) as CDA does not dictate a standardised data collection method (Meyer, 2001: 12). To find a contemporaneous corpus aligned with RQ1, I focused on digital media circulating around COP28, the most recent UN Climate Change negotiations held in Dubai between 30 November – 13 December 2023. As the biggest event of the annual climate calendar and, thus, a prime opportunity to advocate for climate responses, each COP sparks a surge of climate media. Setting my timeframe to 1 November – 15 December 2023 allowed me to capture materials disseminated in the month leading up to the conference, when organisations aim to engage the public and influence the direction of the meetings, and content published immediately after, which reflect on the COP outcomes.

Particularly in digitally mediated and online spaces, the size of the corpus depends on the research objectives (Pihlaja, 2022: 68) so I utilised a purposive sampling strategy (Patton, 2002) within my temporal frame that focused on quality of textual detail over quantity of texts (Rose, 2023: 225). Considering the 'innumerable institutions' of Climate Inc. (Wapner, 2016: 4), I identified five organisations with social authority (Rose, 2023: 242) within the mediapolis that had significant online presence during COP28 and represent varied backgrounds and perspectives (see figure 1). After an initial review of this group's COP28 communication strategies across their digital platforms, I selected two texts from each organisation which together represent an advocacy goal or public engagement campaign that appeared most 'typical' of their discourse during the timeframe (Meyer, 2001: 13). These choices were informed by the use of consistent keywords across texts (Rose, 2023: 359) and hashtags, which act as discursive markers that enable the tracking of public issues (Rose, 2023: 368)

and create intertextual links with other content (Zappavigna, 2021: 299). Each text was published on either Instagram, X or Facebook, with some appearing on multiple corporate social media channels under the same copy; given the undiscerning nature of this social media strategy and my focus on the discursive dimensions of the texts, the platform of dissemination did not influence the selection process. The resulting corpus includes ten texts (see appendix A) that span multiple modes—social media copy, still images and videos—and will henceforth be referenced by each text's identification code.

ID	Organisation	Date established	Description	Selection reasoning
1	UN Climate Change	1992	United Nations entity supporting the global response to climate change	Acts as the secretariat of the COP negotiations
2	COP28 UAE	2021	COP28 Presidency, held by United Arab Emirates (UAE)	COP presidencies set the agenda for the meetings and lead negotiations
3	Greenpeace	1971	International activist group	Established independent activist voice in climate space
4	Earthrise Studio	2020	Small impact-driven media studio for people and planet	Up-and-coming youth-led voice in climate space
5	World Resources Institute (WRI)	1982	Global non-governmental organisation (NGO)	Well-respected think tank with 1,900 staff internationally

Figure 1: List of organisations selected for my sample.

Research design

Recognising that meaning-making is not restricted to language (O'Halloran, 2021: 251), multimodal analysis spans a complex semantic space that complicates the coding and analysis process, particularly when 'dynamic texts' like videos are included in the corpus (O'Halloran, 2021: 253). As meaning is realised across a variety of distinct modes (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 41), I chose to follow Kress and Van Leeuwen's integrative approach (2006: 182) by looking at the material modalities of each text as a type of 'visual grammar' rather than an array of 'words' (2006: 1). This analyses how order and coherence are created through composition (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 210) and the way elements are 'integrated into a meaningful whole' (2006: 179), elucidating the markers of salience, a multimodal principle that assesses how modalities like focus, size, layout, rhythm and gesture stress importance by drawing the eye to some elements over others (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 180). As Kress and Van Leeuwen view social practices and knowledge as underpinning visual grammar (2006: 4), this approach links the textual, discursive and societal levels

in alignment with Fairclough's three-dimensional model for CDA (2013b), which informed the design of my analytical framework (see figure 2).

Discursive dimension	Analytical dimension	Analytical framework	Theoretical questions
Textual	Description	Observes the properties and semiotic resources of the text, specifically: vocabulary/verb modality, repetition, point of view, rhythm, textual structures, visual grammar, salience, composition.	How is perspective is constructed? How are point(s) of view presented and positioned? Are both commonality and difference emphasised? What kinds of temporal or spatial connections are made? How is climate action described or represented?
Discursive	Interpretation	Examines the interactive relationship between text's production and interpretation, including how it interprets context, types of discourse utilised, and how the text evolves or changes.	What kinds of discourses are present? Does the text acknowledge complexity or contestation? How does the text interpret the meaning of climate action? Is the text rooted in felt experience or facts/expertise? How does the text bond the personal to the social? Does the text exhibit any sense of reflexivity?
Societal	Explanation	Considers how the texts' processes of production and interpretation have been shaped by and shape social contexts, including power relations, underlying ideologies, and the way that existing systems of power are maintained or challenged.	Is conventional climate common sense questioned? Does the text uphold a hegemonic frame of reference? How is the text's theory of change rooted in "if only" logic? Does the text illuminate past conceptual constraints? Which ideologies are present and which are absent? What knowledge is the text resisting, obscuring, ignoring? Is privilege and power being protected by 'non-knowings'?

Figure 2: an outline of my analytical framework, following Fairclough (2013b)

To ensure 'fresh eyes', one must begin the analytical process by setting aside preconceived categories and immersing oneself in the texts (Rose, 2023: 229–230). This level of familiarity with the data at a textual level aids the decoding of key themes at a discursive level and the eventual encoding of intertextual and interdiscursive relationships and patterns across the corpus (Meyer, 2001: 3). Moving through the analytical dimensions of description, interpretation and explanation both inductively and deductively, bringing the texts to the theory and the theory to the texts, I connect the micro and macro levels of discourse (Jones et al., 2015: 4) to unveil the social values and significance of the corpus in relation to my research objectives (Fairclough, 2013b: 118). As the quality of discourse analysis depends on the questions being asked (Gill, 1996: 143), my framework is anchored in questions emerging from my theoretical framework regarding a) what discursive elements need to be present in resources for judgement to facilitate imagination and b) which features may signify the constraint of structural ignorance on the imaginative potential of the texts.

Limitations and considerations for future research

My methodological design presents limitations that need acknowledgement before presenting my findings. My focus on the international COP28 meetings gives the corpus a global lens and my selection of English-based materials produced by only five organisations within Climate Inc. has

further reduced the plurality of perspectives and approaches. Enlarging the range of organisations and considering resources for judgement published at other moments in the climate calendar would expand the diversity of narratives and discursive strategies, presenting opportunities for further comparative studies between organisational types, cultural viewpoints and advocacy goals at the local and regional levels. Additionally, the inclusion of non-social media content could enhance narrative variety and provide an opportunity to explore how social media platforms, where complexity is limited by an optimal video duration of 0:30 to 2:00 (Forkel, 2023), may be constraining imagination. Given the scope of my research, I was unable to consider the influence of social media technologies on my texts or explore how internet infrastructures (Plantin et al., 2018) shape semiotic processes by privileging some modes and formats over others and by algorithmically structuring the dissemination and reception of texts (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 227). While 'digital practices always transverse boundaries between the physical and the virtual' (Jones et al., 2015: 3), this analysis was restricted to discursive articulations within the virtual space. Future research could draw on audience studies or utilise focus groups to analyse the reception of such texts and whether shifts can be observed in the public's capacity for imagination through engagement with climate-focused resources for judgement.

Ethics and reflexivity

Any analysis is dependent on and reflective of the researcher's existing positionality, understanding and interests (Taylor, 2001: 12), as we are each only able to see and identify what we have pre-existing knowledge and awareness of (Van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2001: 4). Remaining self-conscious of my analytical process throughout MCDA and staying aware of the common sense assumptions shaping discourse across my texts is integral (Fairclough, 2013b: 139). While 'all knowledge is considered to be situated, contingent and partial' (Taylor, 2001: 319, emphasis in the original), this is particularly relevant as my research project deals with the constraints of unconscious ignorance and structural non-knowing. As a white American raised in a wealthy, powerful nation that continues to lead in the production and consumption of oil and gas (Ritchie and Rosado, 2024), I benefit from legacies of extractivism. This has no doubt led to my absorption of conventional common sense and hegemonic logic that feed the climate ignorance described in this study, hampering my ability to know and imagine. Furthermore, I have produced multimedia climate-focused content for the past decade, working alongside some of the organisations from my dataset and most recently attending COP28, a

positionality that makes me neither neutral nor disinterested. However, the qualitative nature of my research does not purport objectivity or universality; rather, I acknowledge my subjectivity, privilege and the limitations outlined above to offer an analysis that asserts modesty and 'aims to be persuasive rather than truthful' (Rose, 2023: 244). To ensure ethical soundness, the research plan and methodological approach for this study were reviewed by my supervisor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who confirmed on 4 June 2024 that no additional ethics approval was required (Ref: 389321).

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

In addressing the research objectives asserted in RQ1 and RQ2, my analysis is organised according to my theoretical suppositions about how resources for judgement can facilitate imagination and how climate ignorance might be constraining their imaginative potential to create social change (Milkoreit, 2017). Due to my timeframe, most of the texts analysed (see appendix A) provide resources that aim to persuade the public about what approach COP28 should take in dictating international responses to climate change. I will first address RQ1, which asks how contemporary climate-focused resources for judgement facilitate or limit the capacity for imagination, by examining the texts for the presence or absence of the following dimensions, which have both distinct and overlapping qualities: proper distance, which encourages perspective-taking and temporal and spatial continuity to create a 'mediated enlargement of mentality' (Silverstone, 2007: 48); intersubjectivity, which demands acknowledgement of complexity, contestation and plurality that is grounded in 'a feeling for the world, and in the condition of being in the world among others' (Silverstone, 2007: 43); and the expansion of conceptual horizons, which depends on reflexivity, questioning conventional common sense and illuminating 'conceptual constraints that have limited climate discourse and policy' (Wapner, 2016: 4–5). Signs of limited imagination embodied by these resources for judgement will inform my response to RQ2, which queries the extent to which the texts are constrained by climate ignorance as a form of structural non-knowing. Examining what these texts attend to and what they ignore will expose underlying forms of climate ignorance that restrict their capability to provide effective resources for judgement. This analysis reveals an overarching embrace of discourses of objectivity and universality that elide complexity, contestation and reflexivity, resulting in a constrictive imaginative space that impacts the ability of Climate Inc. organisations to produce

narratives challenging the paradigmatic boundaries of global climate discourse, which in turn limit the capacity for imagination in the public sphere to shift the climate impasse.

Proper distance

One way to elucidate how imaginative capacity is facilitated or limited is by examining the texts' provision of proper distance (Silverstone, 2007: 48). As a precondition and integral facet of plurality, proper distance should elucidate 'the other through difference as well as through shared identity' (Silverstone, 2007: 47). At a textual level, this can be analysed through the kinds of perspective(s) presented and how these are implicitly positioned relationally (Fairclough, 2013b). Earthrise (2023a) formulates a collective 'we' in 4B (see figure 3), which in the caption first represents the '800+ leaders standing in courage and resolve' who are urgently (as connoted by the capitalisation and red siren emojis) asking for the audience's help. An indefinite 'you' is used at the beginning, which builds solidarity between the organisation and the audience (Fairclough, 2013b: 106). However, once the audience is invited to join 'us', the collective shifts to become an inclusive 'we' who now stand together at a tipping point, urging the COP28 President and Parties to commit to a 'rapid response plan' representing a shared vision. This positioning of perspectives infuses the text with 'authority to speak for others', flattening a plurality of identities and intentions to construct a united front that serves underlying ideologies (Fairclough, 2013b: 106). Although never labelled as 'they', it is notable that the COP28 group stands with but not within the collective 'we'. This subtle separation allows them to exist in commonality with the inclusive 'we' while still being positioned as the respondents. However, the text does not acknowledge or detail any difference across this triad of perspectives as proper distance would require. Instead, an assumption of shared goals and unity is pervasive, limiting the imaginative capacity of the audience to consider how actions taken (or not taken) are shaped by a plurality of lived experiences.

Figure 3: social media copy and first graphic from 4B's image carousel (earthrise, 2023a)

Another dimension of proper distance is utilising imagination to hold issues 'both close and far' (Silverstone, 2007: 48), forming spatial and temporal connections and fuelling the understanding necessary 'to take our bearings in the world' (Arendt, 1994: 323). Although 1B features the singular voice of UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell (UN Climate Change, 2023b), it presents multiple perspectives by acknowledging Stiell's multifaceted identity. The three video messages from high-level institutional figures in my corpus all use a direct address visual form with speakers looking directly into the camera at eye-level to the lens, establishing an imaginary relationship between speaker and audience that emphasises commonality and equality (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 116, 138). However, the gaze of 1B is disrupted throughout the first fifty-five seconds by Stiell breaking eye contact to intermittently look at something on the viewer's right and through intrusive jump cuts that interrupt his sentences with disorientating zoom and blur transitions. These distractions intrude on the audience's connection with Stiell, whose delivery is further upstaged by two figures setting up just behind his head against a glaring green background (see figure 4).

Figure 4: three stills from 1B showing the disruption of gaze, background figures and zoom transitions (UN Climate Change, 2023b).

1B is the only text to feature a first-person perspective. By stating, 'I am from a small island, we know the challenges that we face' (UN Climate Change, 2023b), Stiell remembers his origins and positions himself within a recognised climate-vulnerable group. Avoiding any elaboration of the challenges referenced, he calls for the solution-oriented attitude of his people to be brought to COP, spatially linking his small island to Dubai. By revealing how his unique background informs his understanding of and approach towards his COP28 responsibilities, the narrative constructs a bond between the personal and the social (Zittoun and Gillespie, 2016: 71). He also projects into the future, recognising that the choices made at COP28 will impact everyone. The temporal and spatial continuity produced in these moments opens the door to imagining how other COP participants' pasts may shape their (in)actions in the present and affect future outcomes. Although hampered by the dissonance of the opening two-thirds, the salience of the final segment contributes to the video's potential of providing proper distance. As he begins talking about his small island roots, the jump cuts stop, the background clears, the field of vision moves from far personal to close personal (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006: 124) and he (mostly) holds his gaze with the viewer, a confluence of semiotic shifts that makes this the most salient section. However, the narrative continues to exhibit the same universality as other texts in my sample, assuming shared perspectives across 'those of us in the process' as well as 'the 8 billion people' who depend on COP28 to deliver solutions (UN Climate

Change, 2023b). For all of the video's emphasis on 'responsibility', it falls short of sustaining 'a sense of the other sufficient not just for reciprocity but for a duty of care, obligation and responsibility, as well as understanding' (Silverstone, 2007: 47).

Intersubjectivity

The presence of intersubjectivity is crucial to proper distance's effectiveness in facilitating imagination (Coleman, 2018: 162). This relies on acknowledging that we each live in the world among others—human, nonhuman and generations both past and future—and that this spectrum of lived experiences and perspectives are complex and plural. The discourse of universality that emerges from my sample not only undermines the texts' provision of proper distance but also the potential of creating the conditions for intersubjectivity. The global movement that 2A (COP28 UAE, 2023a) envisions is comprised of individual 'actionists' (not to be confused with 'activists') from all corners of the world, with the video cutting between a diverse range of anonymous people working on 'projects' at a speed that erases any detail (see figure 5). The scenes that can be glimpsed feature mainly technological solutions, such as solar panels, greenhouses, wind turbines, QR codes and even planes. Driven by fast editing and beating music, the vigorous and energetic rhythm becomes the most salient element of the video, using the music, sound effects and animated text to stress key words like 'action', 'results' and 'leading'. The overall effect emphasises excitement over a substantive understanding of the actions or people that are glimpsed in the video, limiting any felt experience of 'being in the world among others' (Silverstone, 2007: 43).

Figure 5: four stills from 2A showing technological projects and happy 'actionists' (COP28 UAE, 2023a).

The English narration is spoken by an impersonal robotic-sounding male voice who introduces the 'actionists' in the third person, describing them with generic platitudes like 'pioneers', 'changemakers' and 'needle-movers' (COP28 UAE, 2023a) and placing them in a universal bloc separate to the us of COP28. This 'us and them' positioning shifts the duty of climate action to individuals rather than COP28, ignoring their political role in leading the international climate negotiations and instead framing the UAE COP28 Presidency primarily as a platform for visibility that can spotlight potential actionists. Despite the multiplicity of people represented, the individuals themselves remain devoid of subjective experience and instead smile to the camera, seemingly happy to 'lead the charge' and carry the burden of climate action. Absent from this concept of the 'era of actionism' is the UAE's identity as a wealthy petrostate with a long legacy of oil extraction and any responsibility the nation itself holds to phase out fossil fuels or lead the negotiations to a meaningful outcome.

Erasing contestation and plurality blankets the texts in a discourse of objectivity; if all subjectivities are flattened into one universal perspective, then bias is obscured and the organisation's point of view is presented as neutral. This limits the space for intersubjective judgement, which relies upon communication practices where 'political truth emerges from a sensibility towards the complexities and disparities of subjective experience' as opposed to fact-forward strategies that declare unilaterally

what is true (Coleman, 2018: 168–169). Despite this, and in disregard of Arendt's warnings about the political impotency of facts (2006: 246), most of the texts in my sample rely on facts to persuade their audiences. Presenting its dependence on facts upfront, the title of 1A's graphic carousel, '7 essential facts about COP' (UN Climate Change, 2023a), frames the information as objectively 'essential' and impartial. However, the caption reveals the organisation's bias by promising the viewer that by sliding through the images, they will discover not only the what and who of COP but also why it is 'so important' (see figure 6). This presumption of COP's importance embodies discourses of universality (that everyone would agree) and objectivity (that it is unquestionably true), revealing the underlying assumption that COP is 'the driving force behind international political will and action to address global warming' (UN Climate Change, 2023a).

Figure 6: social media copy and first graphic from 1A's image carousel (UN Climate Change, 2023a).

Rampant with superlatives like 'groundbreaking', 'landmark', 'world's largest' and 'most ambitious' (UN Climate Change, 2023a), the seven facts are overlaid onto photographs that indicate the importance of COP: a circular graphical theme signifies unity and wholeness, a motif of shining lights promises light-bulb moments of inspiration and the two faces that appear are pictured smiling with triumphant fists raised. An epic overlook view of the Earth underscores COP's global scale and its worldwide legitimacy is emphasised through a line-up of international flags and iconic landmarks, the Eiffel Tower and Burj Khalifa, from two geographically and culturally disparate metropolises that have each hosted COPs. Despite bold claims that COP is 'crucial to shaping our planet's future' (UN

Climate Change, 2023a), the text avoids any detail about what impact thirty years of COP negotiations have delivered, instead focusing on the ability of these meetings to convene stakeholders and produce agreements. Absent is any mention of political contestation throughout this legacy. Although it lists 'groundbreaking global climate agreements' (UN Climate Change, 2023a) as markers of its success, it leaves out the Kyoto Protocol's political impotence after the United States refusal to ratify it (Hovi et al., 2012), the Global Stocktake's 2023 assessment of insufficient progress towards Paris Agreement goals (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2023) and historical disappointments like the infamous COP15 meetings in Copenhagen that 'ended in failure' (Vidal et al., 2009).

Across the texts, 'facts' are often disseminated from a position of presumptive expertise that treats social and political issues like climate change as phenomena that 'can be identified and explained as incontrovertible truths by employing methods of standardised impartiality' (Coleman, 2018: 159). In 5A, the video opens with World Resources Institute CEO Ani Dasgupta asserting objectively, 'It's clear what the world looks like at 1.1 degrees' (World Resources Institute, 2023a), which occludes any subjective variation of how the 1.1ºC temperature rise globally impacts different people locally. This is mirrored by his closing statement that 'The Global Stocktake makes it clear what needs to happen' (World Resources Institute, 2023a), taking the objective and universal view that there is only one way to understand the results of the first Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement that was presented to COP28 (United Nations, 2023). A similar approach is taken in 4A, which begins and ends with 'that's why science says' (earthrise, 2023b), bookending the video's recommendations in a sense of predetermined authority stemming from scientific institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The set of hegemonic policies that 4A espouses as being dictated by science align closely with the dual lists of three responses that are presented in 5A and 4B, with common demands to: phase out fossil fuels, transform the global food system, strengthen adaptation support for countries facing climate impacts and boost investments in nature and renewable energy (earthrise, 2023a, 2023b; World Resources Institute, 2023a). Although the substance varies slightly across the texts, the discursive techniques they utilise follow a standardised formula of expertise-driven truth-telling that denigrates felt experience (Coleman, 2018: 161). By framing 'necessary' climate responses 'in terms of pre-given norms', these texts limit the imaginative capacity of the public to come to their own understandings and judgements (Coleman, 2018: 162).

Expanding conceptual horizons

The final analytical dimension considers the capacity of the texts to expand conceptual horizons and question conventional understandings, which addresses Zerilli's 'problem of the will' (1998: 449) by opening up the imaginative space to think outside hegemonic frames of understanding and action. Reflexivity is integral to this process (Silverstone, 2007: 52), as illuminating conceptual constraints that have restricted climate progress in the past can expose historical patterns that reveal new political possibilities (Wapner, 2016: 5). However, when a resource for judgement upholds existing paradigmatic boundaries, it reinforces pervasive common sense and limits the imaginative potential of the public to envision new ways of responding to the climate crisis that may disrupt dominant power dynamics (Wapner, 2016: 4–5). One hegemonic paradigm observed across my sample is the 'if only' logic of Climate Inc. (Wapner, 2016: 2), underpinned by the prevailing common sense that climate change could be solved if only we had more of something, such as time, knowledge, commitment or momentum.

The narratives of 1A, 3A and 5B embrace the logic that if the public knew more, action would be possible; meanwhile commitment, dedication and attitude act as the logical linchpins of 1B, 3B, 4A and 4B. The goal of 1B to inspire COP28 participants to move from 'what needs to be done' to 'how to do it' is seen as achievable if only they feel the 'massive responsibility' and adopt a 'solution-oriented attitude' (UN Climate Change, 2023b). Meanwhile, 3B views dedication to the global resistance against oil companies as key to making change. By calling on oil and gas companies directly to stop drilling and start paying, 3B harnesses the logic that if only there was enough moral pressure, the fossil fuel industry would commit to, in essence, putting themselves out of business (Greenpeace, 2023b). In 4A, Earthrise demands a serious commitment from COP28 to phase out fossil fuels and fulfil the obligation of the Action Agenda (earthrise, 2023b), while in 4B they ask the public to show their dedication to bold action by standing with them in courage and resolve behind a 1.5ºC plan (earthrise, 2023a). The final line of 5A explicitly expresses the logic that 'what we need is real momentum' to implement the necessary policies at scale (World Resources Institute, 2023a). While World Resources Institute's (WRI) definition of 'real momentum' is vague, COP28 sees momentum in terms of visibility. In 2A, showing and sharing your actions qualifies you as a momentum-building actionist, with the rationale that 'action builds action' is provided as the closing statement (COP28 UAE, 2023a). Similarly, 2B asserts that change can be led by showcasing the innovations of tech start-

ups (COP28 UAE, 2023b). In aligning momentum with visibility, these texts contend that if only the scale of action was more visible, then enough momentum could be fostered to create meaningful change. Absent across the texts is any reflexive consideration of why progress is not advancing as needed and whether new theories of change that go beyond 'if only' may be warranted.

Within the COP28-focused timeframe of my sample, it is notable that as insiders to the COP process, neither UN Climate Change nor COP28 reference fossil fuels in their conceptual understandings of climate action. Meanwhile, the outsiders—Greenpeace, Earthrise and WRI—each view the continued use of fossil fuels as anathema to climate action. In this way, these organisations are expanding the conceptual horizon of COP28's climate response to include the phase out of fossil fuels; however, their interpretations of action are still anchored in forms of conventional common sense. While the youthful media company Earthrise harnesses fashionable social media trends in its visual style, the underlying conceptual horizons that inform their interpretation of climate action align with the hegemonic discourse of WRI, which was founded almost forty years beforehand. Both propose a familiar list of 'modernist instruments' that appears across Climate Inc. (Wapner, 2016: 9)—renewable energy, electric vehicles, investment and finance, and other highly technical responses—which align with modern lifestyles and economic structures while eliding complexity, contestation and questions about conventional climate common sense.

The conceptual space to imagine new ways of taking action remains narrow, with none of the texts questioning hegemonic assumptions about climate action, such as whether the consensus-based negotiation process of COP is actually effective. The only text to expose conceptual constraints that have held back progress in the past is 5B, which reveals three myths that are 'propping up the fossil fuel industry' (World Resources Institute, 2023b). WRI uses a passive tone of voice to describe these myths that are 'holding back progress', avoiding any reference to their origin or motive. The use of 'myths' rather than 'lies' connotes a mythological ambience, as if they have emerged incidentally and innocently as understandable misconceptions that are part of universally woven stories. By presenting these myths as passive rather than agentic, the text avoids elucidating any historical patterns of organised lying, obfuscation or delayism that may potentiate new paradigms of action. As was consistent across the analysis of the texts' provision of proper distance and intersubjectivity, there is little acknowledgement of complexity, contestation or historical constraints within the conceptual lenses of the texts, thus limiting their capacity to facilitate imagination. While this impacts

the audience's ability to form sound judgements, it is also a sign of restricted imaginative capacity on the production side (Silverstone, 2007: 48). This results in discourses that align with the private interests of the producers (Arendt, 2006: 237) and uphold the structures of power and privilege upon which the organisations rely. Reflexivity is linked to imagination's capacity of liberating media producers from conventional common sense 'and opening up the conceptual space to notice the means by which one is structurally incarcerated' (Wapner, 2016: 5). Thus, an absence of reflexivity signifies a dampened imagination under the constraints of structural ignorance.

Climate Ignorance

Indications of limited imagination on the production side of these texts lead to my second research question, which asks: to what extent are these resources for judgement constrained by climate ignorance as a form of structural 'non-knowing'? This agnotological analysis considers climate ignorance as rooted in legacies of extractivism, agentic in protecting and perpetuating the power and privilege of those that continue to benefit from extractive practices. Drawing on Proctor's (2008) three-dimensional framework of 'native state', 'lost realm' and 'strategic ploy' exposes the political geography of ignorance across the texts. Most prevalent is the state of 'lost realm', which sees ignorance as emerging from selective choice, 'the decision to focus on this is therefore invariably a choice to ignore that' (Proctor, 2008: 14, emphasis in original). By highlighting the success of COPs in 1A (UN Climate Change, 2023a), UN Climate Change ignores the struggles, disappointments and failures across its thirty-year history. Such inattention allows them to avoid questions of what may work better and constructs a state of ignorance that obscures the inequities and uneven power dynamics embedded in the COP process (Depledge, 2024). This was particularly convenient around COP28, which was widely criticised for the selection of petrostate UAE as host country and oil CEO Sultan Al Jaber as COP President (Khadka, 2023). Instead of acknowledging the controversy or reflecting on potentially problematic internal processes, 1A commends COP's hierarchical structure and praises the COP President's role in 'steering the meeting to the most ambitious outcomes' (UN Climate Change, 2023a), maintaining ignorance of potential conflicts of interest that may indeed drive COP28's ambition down.

Due to its role as secretariat of the international negotiations, UN Climate Change's existence is intertwined with the continuance of COPs. Indeed, the organisation's size has grown to match the

increasing workload from additional dialogues and subsidiary bodies (UN Climate Change, n.d.). As such, knowledge of unfairness and ineffectiveness within the consensus-based system of decision-making threatens its facilitative position within the party-driven process. Although consensus is often viewed as a cooperative and just method of decision-making that protects minority views (Seeds for Change, n.d.), its legacy within the COP process can be traced back to the influence of petrostates and fossil fuel lobbyists when establishing the rules of negotiation at COP1 (Depledge, 2024). In this case, the minority views that are protected by consensus are the handful of fossil-fuel producing countries whose positions and privilege may be upended by effective climate action. Thus, the state of 'needing not to know' (O'Neill, 2022) fuelling UN Climate Change's emphasis of COP's role as 'the driving force behind international political will and action' (UN Climate Change, 2023a) is rooted in and serves to protect extractivist ideology, limiting their ability to facilitate imaginative capacity.

The embrace of universality and avoidance of complexity or contestation observed across the texts also align with the 'lost realm' dimension of ignorance. In Greenpeace's texts, this manifests as attention exclusively on the oil and gas industry rather than the ideological structures that underpin their 'deadly activities' (Greenpeace, 2023b). By eliding the 'sheer magnitude and complexity of transitioning from a carbon-based economy' (Wapner, 2016: 1), these texts protect the organisation and the audience from reflecting on their own participation in and potential privilege gained from these systems of extractivism. Instead, blame is directed only at fossil fuel companies in an antagonistic 'us versus them' association that places Greenpeace and the audience on the moral high ground. This is not to dismiss the idea that oil and gas companies need to 'stop drilling and start paying' (Greenpeace, 2023b) nor to infer that the responsibility lies on individuals, as COP28 suggests in 2A (COP28 UAE, 2023a); rather, the climate ignorance that drives this state of non-knowing dampens the imaginative capacity to consider the complexity of the problem holistically or intersubjectively. Consequently, the narrow conceptual lens of the text sustains the status quo by acting as if the fossil fuel industry will simply stop drilling when enough people demand they change. Without critically reflecting on the efficacy of this theory of change, Greenpeace ignores that 'getting out of the carbon world is not simply a matter of severing ties to certain industries or particular forms of collective behaviour, but envisaging and reformulating first principles' (Wapner, 2016: 2).

The impulse to focus on a universal vision for the future while ignoring the uncomfortable complexity and contestation of the past shifts Earthrise's demands in 4B for a 'rapid response plan' (earthrise,

2023a) into a sort of make-believe where it can exist in unrealised perfection; as if this time, a show of courage and resolve on social media will be the positive tipping point. This maintains a state of non-knowing that simultaneously defends the futural vision from inconvenient complexity and protects the organisation from uncomfortable awareness of their complicity in preserving hegemonic norms and systems. Filled with references to conventional climate common sense—target dates like 2030 and 2050, 1.5ºC trajectories, enabling environments to scale up finance—the details of the 'action agenda' and 'rapid response plan' presented in 4A and 4B, respectively (earthrise, 2023a, 2023b), originate from the development logic of multilateral institutions like the United Nations that were set up by rich Western countries who gained their positions of power and wealth through extractive practices. The uncritical usage of this global climate discourse imposes Western (and primarily English) technical terminology onto communities globally, assuming universal meaning despite contextual, linguistic or cultural variety (Castro-Sotomayor, 2019: 1–2), thus recreating historical patterns of colonial expansion. These forms of climate ignorance hamper the imaginative capacity of the organisations producing these texts, resulting in broadly ineffective resources for judgement that fall short in their ability to provide proper distance, encourage intersubjectivity or expand conceptual horizons. In turn, rather than facilitating imagination, these texts limit the public's imaginative capacity and constrain the quality of the climate mediapolis.

CONCLUSION

This research project has analysed the contemporary mediapolis in the context of COP28 to understand how climate-focused resources for judgement, which advocate for specific responses to the climate crisis, facilitate or limit the capacity for imagination. Building on Arendt's contention that imagination is a profoundly political facility fundamental to taking action and making change in the world (1971: 31), I have sought to elucidate the role of climate discourse in maintaining a climate impasse and explore the purchase of imagination in moving from stasis to praxis. In identifying the obstacles to this transition, I have connected Arendt's (2006) understanding of the power of lies and the political impotency of facts to the concept of agnotology, and its recognition of ignorance as a powerful agentic construction with political ramifications (Proctor, 2008: 5) that knowledge is not necessarily able to counter (O'Neill, 2022). Following the work of Mills (2008) and O'Neill (2022), I have proposed climate ignorance as a form of structural 'non-knowing' that upholds systems of extractivism (Alcoff, 2022) and protects the power and privilege of groups benefiting from extractive

practices. The potential impact of this structural ignorance on the imaginative capacity of media producers and consumers led to my second line of enquiry about the extent to which climate-focused resources for judgement are constrained by climate ignorance. For the media to fulfil its responsibility in creating a space that 'works for the human condition and not against it' (Silverstone, 2007: 33), the mediapolis must act as a generator of imagination; however, my analysis of texts produced by Climate Inc. organisations has suggested that imagination is being limited rather than facilitated.

By unpacking Silverstone's (2007) conception of what constitutes a quality resource for judgement and the qualities outlined by Arendt (2006) that lead to imagination in the public and political sphere, I identified three fundamental imaginative dimensions: proper distance, intersubjectivity and the expansion of conceptual horizons. Breaking these into their semiotic aspects, I assessed the discursive landscape of my corpus for the presence (or absence) of: perspective-taking and temporal or spatial continuity; acknowledgement of complexity, contestation and plurality; and a sense of reflexivity that challenges conventional common sense and recognizes past conceptual constraints. The themes emerging from my multimodal critical discourse analysis included discourses of objectivity and universality that leave the texts unmoored from felt experience. Apart from shallow attempts, the texts do not exhibit strong spatial or temporal links to dialogically connect the past, present and future or hold things both close and far, undermining the provision of proper distance. The prevalence of fact-forward and expertise-driven narratives paired with assumptions of universal perspectives, interests and intentions elide representations of complexity, contestation or plurality across the texts, limiting space for intersubjectivity. Finally, the paradigmatic boundaries of the texts are restricted by a general adherence to conventional 'if only' logic and an unquestioning embrace of hegemonic frames of reference, such as neoliberalism, modernist instruments and the technical terminology of global climate discourses. This is in parallel to a lack of reflexivity, which avoids awareness of the conceptual constraints that have historically held back climate progress; in the climate space, imagination is most often considered in its capacity for future imaginaries (Death, 2022; Levy and Spicer, 2013; Milkoreit, 2017) but preventing future injustices requires looking backwards to understand their origins and taking responsibility for what has come before (Medina, 2013: 251). Imagining bold futures without putting them in the context of past contestation and a complex present that is grounded in the 'disparities of subjective experience' (Coleman, 2018: 169) shifts such solutions into a space of make-believe. Instead of an 'enlarged mentality' (Arendt, 2006: 237), these

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resources for judgement exhibit constrained conceptual horizons that signify the underlying influence of climate ignorance.

This unplugging from awareness protects the media producers, and in turn the audience, from knowledge of how their (in)actions maintain the climate impasse. Whether by pursuing theories of change that have historically stalled, proposing responses that uphold modern lifestyles or believing that the consensus processes of COP will lead to urgent and ambitious climate action, the texts embody patterns of non-knowing that protect systems of privilege and power associated with legacies of extractivism. Rooted in a need not to know (O'Neill, 2022: 505), these states of 'lost realm' that ignore aspects of reality (Mills, 2008) inherently dampen the capacity for imagination, which would naturally lead to seeing and understanding 'everything that is too far away from us as though it were our own affair' (Arendt, 1994: 323). Afterall, the provision of proper distance and intersubjective judgement, which facilitate a sense of being in the world among others, exist in opposition to an extractivist ideology that views the planet and all who live on it as resources to be extracted from. These results suggest that a 'critical reimagination' of climate discourse is needed, one that expands beyond a simple intellectual exercise and instead entails a complex, emotionally engaging rearticulation (Medina, 2013: 253) to foster a reflexive, transformative and imaginative state of knowing capable of countering persistent climate ignorance and enabling the production of effective resources for judgement.

This leads me to the final stage of Fairclough's methodological approach, which transitions 'from negative to positive critique' in pursuit of praxis (2023: 17). If narratives are where the world appears most vivid (Silverstone, 2007: 52) and political truth is 'generated through acts and modes of telling' (Coleman, 2018: 164), what new narratives could Climate Inc. craft to facilitate imaginative capacity? Silverstone envisioned the mediapolis as an agonistic space that defines 'both the reality and the possibility of public life' (2007: 53) through the competition of diverse stories, narratives, images and discourses. While my analysis has revealed the dominance of fact-forward narratives and discourses of objectivity, which constrict imaginative capacity, factual truth in the hands of the storyteller can facilitate a Hegelian 'reconciliation with reality' (Arendt, 2006: 257). This capacity 'to teach acceptance of things as they are' is what Arendt considers to be the political function of storytellers, leading to truthfulness and effective judgement (2006: 258). By exploring narratives that accept the complexity of subjective reality rather than promote an objective universality, storytellers can participate in

Medina's 'politics of acknowledgement', where acknowledgement rises above both agreement and disagreement as the imperative connective tissue in creating 'a radically pluralistic sensibility' (2013: 281). Embracing the notion of communication as 'a process of collective reasoning', rather than a need to unite audiences behind a singular understanding (Silverstone, 2007: 42–43), would benefit climate media producers, like myself, in facilitating the capacity for imagination and, thus, helping to realise the potential of the mediapolis to move from climate stasis to climate praxis.

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APPENDICE

Appendix A: Full list of 10 texts in research sample

Text ID	Organisation	Text description	Platform	Modes	Date posted	Followers	Likes	Hashtags
1A	UN Climate Change	Image carousel of 8 designed graphics with photographs and text	Facebook	Images + Social media copy	4/11/23	515000	107	#COP28
1B	UN Climate Change	Edited video (1:21) featuring to-camera address by UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell with captions	Instagram	Vertical video + Social media copy	30/11/23	915000	739	#COP28
2A	COP28 UAE	Edited video (1:00) with music, narration, animated text, graphics and transitions	X	Horizontal video + Social media copy	28/11/23	67500	100	#Actionism #COP28
2B	COP28 UAE	Quick cutting vertical video (0:30) with music	X	Vertical video + Social media copy	7/12/23	67500	49	#Actionism #COP28
3A	Greenpeace	Edited video (0:47) with split screen, music, narration, animated text and captions	Instagram	Vertical video + Social media copy	14/12/23	3900000	2276	#MakePollutersPay #EndFossilCrimes
3B	Greenpeace	Video compilation (0:53) of photos with animated text and music	Instagram	Square video + Social media copy	15/12/23	3900000	1256	#MakePollutersPay #EndFossilCrimes
4A	Earthrise Studio	Edited video (0:41) featuring to-camera address by climate scientist Johan Rockström with captions	Instagram	Vertical video + Social media copy	9/12/23	291000	1441	#LaterIsTooLate #COP28
4B	Earthrise Studio	Image carousel with 5 designed graphics using photographs and text	Instagram	Images + Social media copy	8/12/23	291000	1758	#LaterIsTooLate #COP28
5A	WRI	Edited video (1:00) featuring to-camera address by WRI CEO Ani Dasgupta with b-roll, music and captions (links to Time op-ed)	Facebook	Square video + Social media copy	9/12/23 and 30/11/23	188000	3	#COP28
5B	WRI	Image carousel with 4 designed graphics using photographs and text (links to Time op-ed)	X	Images + Social media copy	7/12/23	204200	8	#COP28

Appendix B: Sample texts and URLs (partially abridged)

1A: graphics 1-8 from image carousel (UN Climate Change, 2023a)

https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=659497692976875&id=100067499490396&mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=2IbvMp56APZpeFOF&checkpoint_src=any

1B: video (UN Climate Change, 2023b)

https://www.instagram.com/reel/C0RWKAnR9jS/?igsh=MWs4NHU0ZXYzbmUyOA%3D%3D

2A: video (COP28 UAE, 2023a)

https://x.com/COP28_UAE/status/1729387299987743182

2B: video (COP28 UAE, 2023b)

https://x.com/COP28_UAE/status/1732722052262498641

3A: video (Greenpeace, 2023a)

https://www.instagram.com/reel/C01XLevM9wH/?igsh=dGlxcmt4ajN1dzFh

3B: video (Greenpeace, 2023b)

https://www.instagram.com/reel/C03_3YAPf_y/?igsh=MW52cXZpMW0wZHBlcg%3D%3D

4A: video (earthrise, 2023b)

https://www.instagram.com/reel/C0onlKjINrT/?igsh=aXR2NG1kdGgwbXZj

4B: graphics 1-5 from image carousel (earthrise, 2023a)

https://www.instagram.com/p/C0lal46o2Qs/?igsh=MXhyamIwczBqYWRyYg%3D%3D&img_index=5

5A: video (World Resources Institute, 2023a)

https://www.instagram.com/reel/C0RRMuzsdtp/?igsh=MXhlb3R4ZWF2aW1lNg%3D%3D

5B: graphics 1-4 from image carousel (World Resources Institute, 2023b)

https://x.com/WorldResources/status/1732869573701964080

Appendix C: Annotated images (partially abridged)

Appendix D: Coding frame (partially abridged)

THEME	SUB-THEME	CODE	EXAMPLES
PROPER DISTANCE	**Perspective**	**Universal "we"**	5A: "At COP in Dubai this year we need leaders to step up..."
		Institutional "us"	1B: "Those of us who are going to fill these halls over the course of the next two weeks have a massive responsibility..."
		Outsider "they"	2A: "Actionists. Pioneers from every corner of the world. Turning agreements into actions. Promises into projects. Rhetoric into results. They are the changemakers, needle movers, and momentum builders leading the charge against climate change." 3A: "Oil and gas giants celebrated their sky high profits while the world reeled from the most extreme weather. Where is the justice?"
		Personal "I"	1B: "I am from a small island"
		Audience "you"	2B: "Visit http://COP28.com to get your FREE Day Pass"
		Contingent collective "you" > "we" / "us"	2A: "Sounds like you? Show us and let COP28 spotlight you. 8 billion eyes are watching, let's unite to create a global movement and inspire a new era of actionism." 4B: "WE NEED YOUR HELP 🟥 🟥 it's time to spread the word. Will you join 800+ leaders standing in courage and resolve with the COP28 President & all Parties in bringing us together behind a 1.5ºC plan."
	Both close and far	**Spatial linking**	1B: "I am from a small island...We are solution oriented people and it is that attitude that we must bring to this COP."
		Temporal continuity	4B: "while ensuring the tripling of global renewable energy capacity by 2030 from 2022 levels" 5A: "It's clear what the world looks like at 1.1 degrees: disaster across the world and untold human suffering. And it's only going to get worse."
		Commonality	3B: "They are painting their hands symbolizing oil to call out the deadly activities of oil companies...creating a common image across the globe" with visuals of the painted hands
		Difference	3A: "OVER 600 PEOPLE IN 28 COUNTRIES AND 3 GREENPEACE SHIPS JOINED THE GLOBAL RESISTANCE AGAINST THE OIL COMPANIES"
		Personal > social	1B: "I am from a small island, we know the challenges that we face."
	Temporality	**Past of success**	1A: "The COPs have led to groundbreaking global climate agreements including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement."
		Present urgency	1A: " The urgency of action is now"
		Future vision	4A: "Coal needs to be completely phased out by 2050. Absolute zero. Oil and gas, there will be a residual."