Professor Daniel Gottlieb joined the LSE in 2019. His research interests focus on the theory of contracts and behavioural economics, especially as they apply to insurance markets. His research blends theory with field experiments, lab experiments, and observational data. His work has been published in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Financial Economics, and many other journals. He has served on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, Economica, the Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, the Review of Economic Design, the Journal of Risk and Insurance, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

Previous to the LSE, Professor Gottlieb was at Washington University’s Olin School of Business and at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and a visiting researcher at Harvard University and Princeton University. He received his PhD from MIT in 2009 and is originally from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Publications:

• "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?" (with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans), Forthcoming at the Review of Financial Studies
• "Lapse-Based Insurance" (with Kent Smetters), Forthcoming at the American Economic Review
• "Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents" (with Xingtan Zhang), Econometrica Vol. 89, No. 2 (March, 2021), 793–824
• "Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience" (with Patrick DeJarnette, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva), Econometrica, 88 (2), 619-656, 2020
• "Moral Incentives in Credit Card Debt Repayment: Evidence from a Field Experiment" (with Leonardo Bursztyn, Stefano Fiorin, and Martin Kanz), Journal of Political Economy, 2019
• "The Generalized Informativeness Principle" (with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans), Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
• "An Example of Non-Existence of Riley Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection" (with Eduardo Azevedo), Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
• "Narrow Framing and Long-Term Care Insurance: Evidence from the HRS" (with Olivia S. Mitchell), Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2019
• "Does Improved Information Improve Incentives?" (with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans), Journal of Financial Economics, 2018
• "Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection" (with Eduardo Azevedo), Econometrica, 2017
• "Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning" (with Renato Gomes and Lucas Maestri), Games and Economic Behavior, 2016
• "Imperfect Memory and Choice Under Risk", Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
• "Risk-Neutral Firms Can Extract Unbounded Profits from Consumers with Prospect Theory Preferences" (with Eduardo Azevedo), Journal of Economic Theory, 2012
• "Should Educational Policies Be Regressive?" (with Humberto Moreira), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012
• "Competition Over Time-Inconsistent Consumers", Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008
• "A Model of Mixed Signals with Applications to Countersignaling" (with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira), RAND Journal of Economics, 2007
• "Asymmetric Information in late 19th century Cooperative Insurance Societies", Explorations in Economic History, 2007

Working papers:

• "Will You Never Learn? Self Deception and Biases in Information Processing"
• "Prospect Theory, Life Insurance, and Annuities"
• "Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard" (with Humberto Moreira)
• "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability" (with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans)
• "Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard" (with Humberto Moreira)
• "Thinking and Deciding" (with Matthew Rabin)

 Managerial Economics and Strategy Faculty Research Group