Email
g.deschamps@lse.ac.uk

Office Address
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

Placement Officer
Matthias Doepke

Supervisors
Oriana Bandiera
Nava Ashraf

References
Oriana Bandiera
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk

Nava Ashraf
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
n.ashraf1@lse.ac.uk

Rachael Meager
UNSW Business School (E12)
Cnr Union Road and College Road
UNSW Sydney
Kensington NSW 2052, Australia 
r.meager@unsw.edu.au

Robin Burgess
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
r.burgess@lse.ac.uk

Matthias Doepke
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
m.doepke@lse.ac.uk

Download Gabriela's c.v.

Motherhood and Violence 

Most empirical studies find that motherhood is a risk factor for experiencing Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). This paper explores two potential mechanisms that could account for this phenomenon. First, having a baby might trigger violent behavior. Alternatively, it could raise separation costs, making mothers less likely to leave violent partners. This can result in a higher risk of violence for mothers even if men’s behavior remains constant. Using a dynamic model with asymmetric information that links violence, fertility, and separation, I show that these equilibria look observationally equivalent and that conditioning on civil status results in sample selection bias. To disentangle the two equilibria, I use Mexican survey data and changes in contraceptive access. I find that becoming a mother increases the risk of experiencing IPV by 50%, not because men become more violent once they are fathers, but because motherhood traps women in abusive relationships. I Link to paper.

Works in progress

Property as a Driver of Violence: Evidence from Mexico.
This paper examines the effect of increasing homemakers' post-divorce property rights on intimate partner violence in the context of a developing country. Using a change in Mexican legislation that awarded homemakers up to 50% of marital assets, I analyze the short-term impact of increasing asset ownership on women home homicides at the municipality level. I find that the effect of the reform depends on the underlying unilateral divorce regulation. Increasing asset ownership in municipalities that require both spouses to agree to divorce has no effect on women home homicides. However, municipalities in states that adopted homemaker compensation reform and allowed for unilateral divorce had an increase in women home homicides of .08 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. This effect represents approximately one-ninth of a standard deviation of women home homicides in the data. 

Structural Transformation and Children Time Use Allocation, with Ameek Singh.