Chateau du Baffy, Normandy, France, 30 July‒2 August 2010
This Voting Power in Practice workshop was generously sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust.
Call for papers | Note on workshop discussion topic | Workshop programme
Papers
These were posted for the benefit of participants to read prior to the workshop. Often they are draftworks in progress or have citation restrictions. Please do not quote from the texts without permission from the author. Affiliations and emails of all workshop participants are given at the end of the workshop programme above. The papers/abstracts below are listed in their order of presentation at the workshop.
- The underlying assumptions of electoral systems by Moshé Machover (LSE and King's College London)
- The underlying assumptions of electoral systems ‒ comment on Machover by DanFelsenthal (University of Haifa and LSE)
- Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m≥2) must be elected by Dan Felsenthal (University of Haifa and LSE)
- On the relevance of theoretical results to voting system choice by Hannu Nurmi (Public Choice Research Centre and University of Turku)
- The impact of group coherence on the likelihood of voting paradoxes by William Gehrlein (University of Delaware) and Dominique Lepelley (University of La Réunion)
- The value of research based on simple assumptions about voters' preferences by William Gehrlein (University of Delaware) and Dominique Lepelley (University of La Réunion)
- Election inversions and the US Electoral College by Nicholas Miller (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)
- Assessing the probability of the referendum paradox by Rahhal Lahrach (University of Caen) and Vincent Merlin (University of Caen)
- Electoral reform in Germany: A positive twist to negative voting weights? by Friedrich Pukelsheim (University of Augsburg)
- Manipulability, decisiveness and responsiveness in voting rules by William Zwicker (Union College) See also section 4 of Voting with rubber bands, weights and strings
- Putting paradoxes into perspective by Ken Ritchie (Electoral Reform Society) and Alessandro Gardini (Electoral Reform Society)
- Which result for which voting rule? An analysis based on a framed field experiment on approval and evaluation voting rules by A. Baujard (University of Caen), H.Igersheim (University of Strasbourg) and J. F. Laslier (École Polytechnique, Paris)
- In Silico voting experiments by Jean-Francois Laslier (École Polytechnique, Paris)
- Social threshold aggregations by F.T. Aleskerov (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia), V. V. Chistyakov and V. A. Kalyagin (State University Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia) See also Tables & graphs
- Approval balloting for fixed-sized committees by D. Marc Kilgour and Erica Marshall (Wilfried Laurier University, Ontario, Canada)
- The structure of the election-generating universe by T. Nicolaus Tideman (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia) and Florenz Plassmann (State University of New York at Binghamton)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy proofness by M. Remzi Sanver (Bilgi University, Istanbul) and William Zwicker (Union College)
- A stochastic synopsis of binary voting rules by Olga Ruff and Friedrich Pukelsheim(University of Augsburg)