Graduate Economic History Seminars 2024-25

Winter Term 2024-25

Time: Wednesdays 1-2pm
Venue: CBG.1.06

22 January

• Magnus Neubert (Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg)
• Why railways fail: Colonial railways and economic development in Habsburg Bosnia-Herzegovina
  
  Abstract: 
  Are railways always a harbinger of prosperity? We examine the economic effects of railways in Bosnia-Herzegovina under Habsburg colonial rule. Our novel dataset consistently tracks the non-agrarian population share of over 4,500 settlements in Habsburg Bosnia in 1885, 1895, and 1910, based on census records. Applying the inconsequential units approach, with least cost paths as our instrumental variable, we estimate the effect of railway access on structural transformation. Normal-gauge railways deindustrialized Bosnian settlements by exposing local crafts to imperial competition. Narrow-gauge railways accelerated structural transformation temporarily, primarily by attracting foreigners. Narrow-gauge railways had a more sustained impact on structural transformation in settlements endowed with human capital and secured by law enforcement. Our findings suggest colonial railways are no silver bullet for economic development; transport infrastructure requires development prerequisites to have a lasting positive effect.

29 January

• Giacomo Marcolin (Northwestern University)
• The Role of Pregnancy in Gender Discrimination: Evidence from the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
  
  Abstract: 

  Gender discrimination remains a persistent issue in labor markets, and identifying its drivers is crucial for guiding policy. Fertility-related concerns are a clear candidate, but isolating their role is challenging, as pregnancy discrimination is typically addressed under broader gender-discrimination policies. This was not the case before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978: while employers were prohibited from discriminating based on gender by existing laws, they could legally dismiss workers for being pregnant. In this paper, we calibrate a matching model to find that: (i) the effect of the PDA on employment is unambiguously negative unless it significantly raises firing costs for discriminating employers, and (ii) if strongly implemented, the law could increase women's employment, but only if the degree of discrimination is low. We then examine the effects of the PDA empirically, exploiting quasi-experimental variation from the staggered enactment of similar policies across US states. Difference-in-differences analyses, based on individual-level survey data, show that the PDA had negative effects on employment and hiring of fertile-age women, and null effects on job dismissals. These findings suggest that fertility is a key driver of discrimination and that the PDA was ineffective in sufficiently increasing the costs of firing discrimination.

5 February

• Michele Bolla (Cambridge)
• Divergence beyond GDP and real wages. An Anglo-Italian occupational comparison, 1400-1600
  
  Abstract:
  Thanks to recent studies, the "Little Divergence" can be characterised in terms of output growth. However, our quantitative understanding of the structural changes underlying instances of output growth (or its absence) is considerably inferior. Before 1700, series of direct estimates of occupational structure are only available for England and Wales, which severely limits the scope for quantitative structural comparisons. I focus on Central-Northern Italy as a comparator for England ca. 1400-1600, using direct occupational information from early modern fiscal sources and parish registers. I also critically assess, and ultimately revise estimates of the English occupational structure before 1600, when the available estimates are most uncertain. The revised English estimates can be compared with estimates for Tuscany ca. 1427 and for the northern Italian region of Lombardy around 1540 (and 1575). The comparison highlights that as late as in the mid-sixteenth century England lagged considerably behind one of the most advanced parts of Europe “structurally” as well as in income levels. In turn, this points at faster structural transformation in England ca. 1550-1600 than previously estimated.

12 February

• Michelle Zampa (Geneva Graduate Institute)
• Janus Faces of Progress: Evaluating the dual strategy of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno for Regional Development, 1950-1984
  
  Abstract: 

  The role of governments in economic development, a long-standing debate in economics, has gained renewed interest following the 2009 crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Concurrently, a discussion on the role of national Development Banks in stimulating local economies, a domain where empirical studies remain limited, has also regained traction. As Post-WWII Italy faced significant economic inequality, with the South lagging behind the North, the Italian government sought to address the divide by creating the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (CasMez), an Italian development bank active from 1950 to 1984. CasMez's 30-year operation, marked by both acclaim and controversy, provides a crucial case study in governmental efforts to reduce regional disparities. This paper assesses CasMez's impact on Southern Italian economic development during its activity.

19 February

• Eoin Dignam (LSE)

• Heterogeneous Impacts of Climate Conditions in Spain: 1904-1934
  
  Abstract:
  Using annual estimates of GDP per capita for Spanish provinces from 1904 to 1934, I investigate the impact of temperature and precipitation variation on regional inequality. Secondly, I test for differences in climate resilience across space and time. Provisional results suggest that climate resilience significantly improved in the 1920s. I find evidence that this is partly driven by the increased integration of the Spanish economy, as measured by improvements in the road network. I also find no significant differences in climate resilience between the 13 “latifundios provinces”-  provinces chosen for land reform in the 1930s - and other provinces. These findings provide important insight into climate resilience, as well as into the economic context on the eve of the Spanish civil war.

5 March

• Noah Sutter (LSE)
• The New Regime of the Family - Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth and the Code Napoléon in France 1791-1870

12 March

• Tianning Zhu (LSE)
• Women’s marriage migration in historical China

19 March

• Matthew Purcell (LSE)

• Evolving Obstetrical Practices and Outcomes in Black Hospitals: Evidence from the Lincoln Hospital (Durham, NC)

26 March

• Andres Irarrazaval (LSE)
• The Historical Fabric of Inequality in the Developing World: Property, Markets, or Redistribution?
  
  Abstract:
  

  What explains higher inequality in the Developing World? I revisit and extend Acemoglu et al.´s (2001) seminal colonial origins thesis by leveraging a novel dataset. While they focus on ‘extractive’ institutions as a set of broadly elite-serving institutions that limit growth, I examine which specific institutions matter for inequality. To refine identification, I (a) use new European settlers´ data from colonial records and add colonizers’ human capital stock. To disentangle mechanisms, I (b) use detailed distribution data, separating underlying property and market disparities and redistributive systems –taxes and transfers. To underpin the timing and historical drivers of the inequality divergence, I (c) trace causal chains from pre-colonial factors to post-colonial reforms. The results confirm that more European settlers led to lower long-run inequality. The building of democratic political institutions, and not the initial human capital stock, is the key driver. However, the results challenge the inequality channels emphasized by the literature. The lack of democracy did not stop post-colonial states from addressing colonial-era property disparities, nor did it hinder the global shift to free markets and secure property rights. However, weak democratic checks did erode states' capacity to credibly commit to effective spending, and thereby, states´ ability to establish large direct taxes on citizens. In turn, the lack of the citizens’ political voice limited the pressure for more social spending. The resulting lack of redistributive systems explains 80% of higher inequality in the Developing World. There, the fiscal welfare state that compressed inequality in Western nations in the 20th century never materialized.

2 April

• Anne Schaller (Vanderbilt)
• Procompetitive Effects of State Antitrust Laws: Evidence from the Progressive Era
  
  Abstract:
  

  Most U.S. states adopted an antitrust statute in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century to regulate anticompetitive conduct and promote competition among firms. I estimate the long-term effects of these laws on manufacturing outcomes and patenting behavior using difference-in-differences and event study models that account for the staggered nature of treatment timing. Using county-by-industry tabulations from historical censuses of manufactures, I find that the enactment of state antitrust laws decreased average profits in the manufacturing sector by about 16 percent, a result that is consistent with a shift to more competitive markets. I also find that the enactment of state antitrust laws increased the number of manufacturing establishments by about 26 percent. I also find that the enactment of state antitrust laws increased patents granted to individuals by about 76 percent and patents granted to firms by about 3 percent. Moreover, by using historical newspaper data to proxy for enforcement of state antitrust laws, I show that these effects were likely driven by high-enforcement states. I also show that in cases where a state antitrust law was repealed by a legislative act or overturned by a court ruling, effects went in the opposite direction—average profits increased and the number of manufacturing establishments decreased. These results provide historical evidence that antitrust policy can be an effective means of promoting competition in the U.S. economy and imply that enforcement played an important role in steering markets towards competitive equilibria.