Dr Ryan Jablonski CON 4.14

This course is available on the BSc in Government, BSc in Government and Economics, BSc in Government and History and BSc in Politics and Philosophy. This course is available with permission as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit and to General Course students.

The course is capped at one group. The deadline for enrolments is 12 noon on Friday 30th September.

Government students should have completed GV101 Introduction to Political Science or equivalent.

Most governments in the developing world have adopted electoral institutions, many in the last few decades. However, these institutions vary considerably in their ability hold politicians accountable. Emergent democracies are frequently plagued by violence, fraud, corruption, weak accountability, and clientelism. This seminar is a discussion of the nature of electoral institutions in developing democracies, with a particular focus on the causes and consequences of these ills. Among other things, we will seek answers to the following questions: Why do governments adopt electoral institutions, but then fail to permit free and fair voting? When and why do governments use fraud and violence to win elections? What has been the impact of development aid, election monitoring and democracy assistance on elections and democratization? To answer these questions we will draw on an emerging political science literature on these issues, as well as several case studies. Students are expected to be active participants in this course, and will participate in several class debates and writing exercises.

20 hours of lectures in the LT.

Each class will begin with a lecture, followed by a discussion and – in the latter half of the course – presentations by one or more students.

There will be a Reading Week in Week 6 of LT.

Students will be expected to produce 1 essay of 1,000 words in the LT.

Stokes, Susan C., et al. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: the puzzle of distributive politics. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” World Politics 55, no. 3: 399-422.

Zakaria, F. 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs 76: 22-43.

Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science 44.01 (2014): 149-179.

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. "What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism." American Journal of Political Science 56.3 (2012): 568-583.

Essay (90%, 4000 words) in the ST.
Presentation (10%) in the LT.