Natalja Deng (Cambridge) “Passage and temporal experience”

Abstract: The conflict between an objective passage of time and relativistic physics is sometimes summed up as follows: first, relativistic physics implies a ‘B-theoretic’ or ‘block universe’ view of time, and second, the B-theory implies that there is no objective passage. Here, I’ll take issue with the second entailment claim. I begin by presenting the case for veridicalism, the claim that we don’t have perceptual experiences as of (A-theoretic) passage. I show how nonetheless various elements of experience (broadly construed) combine to give rise both to the theory-neutral idea that time passes, and to an A-theoretic way of thinking about passage. I then argue that there’s a kernel of truth in McTaggart’s inconsistency charge, which is that coherent A-theories are no nearer to doing justice to this way of thinking than is the B-theory. Thus, there is reason to think of passage differently. I consider suggestions for where to locate passage within the B-theory, and relate these to wholesale rejections of the A versus B distinction. Finally, I respond to a number of objections.